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SRTMA: Reappraising the BP Well Blowout in Light
of Pippen, Theriot, Doiron, and Grubart
John J. Costonis* 
PREFACE
The present Article, along with a recently published companion 
piece,1 addresses choice of law and jurisdictional issues posed by tortious
or contractual events associated with the binary terrestrial/aquatic 
enterprise of oil and gas drilling operations on the nation’s Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS). Among the circuits, the Fifth Circuit has been 
this jurisprudence’s dominant author because the OCS adjacent to the 
Gulf states is home to most of the nation’s offshore oil and gas production.
The Circuit has struggled to accommodate general maritime oil pollution 
law with pertinent federal statutes and with the United States Supreme 
Court’s view of the general maritime law, both independent of or as 
modified by these statutes as the Court understands both. No easy task, the
Circuit’s efforts have generated what Professor David W. Robertson has
labeled “an infamously chaotic area of the law,”2 a view undisputed in the
Circuit’s candid self-assessment of these efforts.3 
Featured in both articles is Congress’s Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act (OCSLA),4 which speaks directly to the choice of federal law, if
available, and for adjacent state law when gaps in federal law require the
adoption of state law as surrogate federal law. Similarly notable is
Congress’s Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).5 OPA precludes such gaps 
by defining a comprehensive federal recovery and damages remedial
scheme featuring substantive, procedural, and limitation of liability 
prescriptions. These prescriptions duplicate, and in many instances
surpass and reconfigure, the pre-OPA general maritime law, thereby
Copyright 2020, by JOHN J. COSTONIS.
* Chancellor-Emeritus, Louisiana State University Law Center.
1. John J. Costonis, The BP MDL and Its Aftermath: Whither OPA’s
Displacement Jurisprudence?, 93 TUL. L. REV. 511 (2019).
2. David W. Robertson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act’s Provisions 
on Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Choice of Law: Correcting the Fifth Circuit’s
Mistakes, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 487, 489 (2007).
3. See infra text accompanying note 168.
4. Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified and amended as 43
U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
5. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified and amended as 33 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
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348 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
furnishing the framework for my prior article’s claim that OPA displaces
the pre-OPA maritime law oil pollution tort.
The Supreme Court’s contributions are twofold. One is its
interpretation of OCSLA’s legislative history as so hostile to admiralty 
law’s role in oil discharge governance that it substantiates the Court’s
conclusion that “exploration and development of the Continental Shelf are 
not themselves maritime commerce.”6 The second is its redefinition of 
admiralty jurisdiction perfected in its 1995 opinion in Jerome B. Grubart
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. to include both an event’s location on 
navigable waters and its status as having a “substantial relationship to a
traditional maritime activity” (SRTMA).7 These Supreme Court rulings— 
the second of which comports with the Fifth Circuit’s many rulings that 
activities servicing maritime oil and gas drilling operations are not
inherently maritime in character—mirror a viewpoint confirmed in the
Circuit’s en banc In re Doiron decision addressed at length in this Article.8 
The positions favored in a consolidated Limitation of Liability/BP MDL
trial was that OPA does not displace the general maritime law oil pollution
tort and that OCS oil and gas operations conducted from a vessel qualify as
a SRTMA event. This Preface leaves my disagreement with both contentions
to the bodies of the articles themselves and instead briefly explores plausible
linkages between the Circuit’s admiraltycentrism—framed in one opinion 
as the Circuit’s “reflexive invocation of admiralty jurisdiction to cover
contracts involving movable offshore rigs”9—to the “infamous[] chao[s]”
cited by Professor Robertson.
Useful as background for pursuing these linkages are the contrasting 
conceptions of the federal admiralty judge’s role advanced, respectively, 
by Fifth Circuit Judges John Brown and W. Eugene Davis. Writing in 
1992, Judge Brown’s choice of a title, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the 
Sea of Maritime Law?,10 reflects his thesis that centuries of aggressive,
indeed heroic, American admiralty judges and admiralty opinions have 
been replaced in more recent times by Congressional legislation more 
invasive of admiralty jurisdiction’s boundaries and a Supreme Court more
deferential to this legislation. Hence, Judge Brown’s plaint that the Court 
“has recently abandoned its Constitutional duty of enunciating maritime
law in favor of conforming admiralty law to Congressional enactments
6. Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 425 (1985).
7. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 534 (1995) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 947 U.S. 358, 462 (1990)).
8. See infra Section I.C.
9. See Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1990).
10. Judge John Brown,Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of Maritime Law?,
25 HOUS. J. INT’LL. 257 (2003) (reprinted from 24 J.MAR. L.&COM. 249 1993).
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  71 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
  
 
   
  
  
   
  
    
 
   
    
  
   
  
  
    
   
  
   
 
   
    
      
    
   
   
     
 
    
      
 
3492020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
and filling in gaps in maritime law only when authorized by Congress.”11 
Judge Brown offers the following passage from Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. as evidence of what he terms the 
“Demise of the Admiralty Judge”12:
We no longer live in an era when seamen and their loved ones 
must look primarily to the courts as a source of substantive legal
protection from injury and death; Congress and the States have 
legislated extensively in these areas. In this era, an admiralty 
court should look primarily to these legislative enactments for
policy guidance. We may supplement these statutory remedies
where doing so would achieve the uniform vindication of such
policies consistent with our constitutional mandate, but we must
also keep strictly within the limits imposed by Congress. 13 
Several of Judge Brown’s opinions referenced in the current Article
manifest this shift in the relative prominence of the two institutions’ 
lawmaking roles. They begin with Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes,14 in which Judge
Brown selected admiralty law to cover a worker’s death on an OCS fixed 
platform. The Supreme Court overruled Snipes in Rodrigue v. Aetna
Casualty & Insurance Co.,15 which interpreted OCSLA to favor surrogate
state law over admiralty law in such instances. Other decisions include 
Sohyde Drilling Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co.,16 which both
overrode the Admiralty Extension Act17 and ruled that a well blowout is
not SRTMA-qualified. Additionally, Judge Brown performed an admiralty 
contract analysis in Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Engineering,
(PLT),18 which employed OCSLA and Rodrigue to deny admiralty law
status for an OCS gathering pipe project. In PLT, Judge Brown stated that 
Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp.,19 a leading admiralty contract precedent,
afforded “no comfort” against this OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A) choice 
because it ignored that “Congress determined that the general scope of
11. Id. at 283.
12. Id. at 294 (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990)).
13. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
14. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
15. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
16. 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981). 
17. Pub L. No. 80-695, 62 Stat. 496 (1948) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.
app. § 740 (2006)).
18. 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990)
19. 783 F.2d 527, 538–39 (5th Cir. 1986). Theriot is discussed in Section I.C 
of this Article.
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350 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
OCSLA’s coverage, . . . would be determined principally by locale,”20 
rather than by subject matter.
Judge Davis, author of the Fifth Circuit’s In re Doiron en banc
decision,21 takes a different view of the matter. Confident that “[admiralty
judges] do not deserve the pejorative—‘flotsam on the sea of 
admiralty,’”22 he views the Supreme Court opinions cited by Judge Brown 
as “reflect[ing] the role that the Constitution sets forth for admiralty 
judges, as the Supreme Court has defined that role for 150 years.”23 
“Where Congress has acted,” he contends, “the admiralty judge’s role is
similar to what it always has been: to determine applicable maritime law
according to principles that have endured for centuries and in light of 
rules and codes set forth by the appropriate governing authority.”24 For 
Judge Davis, it’s not so much about the heroics of Justice Story in 
DeLovio v. Boit25 or Justice Brown in The Osceola26 as it is about
disciplined coordination with Congress when initiatives of the latter
impact admiralty law as understood by admiralty judges.
If the BP litigation’s non-displacement and pro-SRTMA outcomes are 
to be the measure, Judge Davis’s commitment to the continuing vigor of
the admiralty judge comes out ahead, although for reasons not necessarily
aligned with his stance. In fact, the BP MDL’s two holdings are heroic, if
misconceived, understandings of Congress’s OCSLA and OPA and the 
Supreme Court’s SRTMA concept. If my critique of both as
admiraltycentric is credible, they improperly arrest initiatives designed to
cabin and contextualize the scope of admiralty tort law and of admiralty
jurisdiction as both bear upon OCS oil and gas operations.
By the term “admiraltycentric,” I intend either the attribution of 
admiralty jurisdiction when it is not warranted, or the faulty attribution of
substantive admiralty law rather than state law or federal statutory law 
when either of the latter governs. An instance of the former is this Article’s
opposition to designating an event as an admiralty tort even though it does
not satisfy the SRTMA requirement. The latter occurs when an admiralty-
20. Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng’g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043, 1048–49
(5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 219 
(1986)).
21. 879 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2018). 
22. W. Eugene Davis, The Role of Federal Courts in Admiralty: The
Challenges Facing the Admiralty Judges of the Lower Federal Courts, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 1355, 1385 (2001).
23. Id. at 1368–69.
24. Id. at 1384.
25. 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (Justice Story).
26. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
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3512020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
displacing federal statute such as OPA § 2702 governs a maritime oil 
discharge, but admiralty law is favored as a consequence of a faulty 
application of OCSLA § 1333(a).27 I do not deem these outcomes
admiraltycentric because they favor an admiralty outcome. Their fault lies
instead in the patent shortcomings offered in their defense that both 
articles painstakingly identify.
Four considerations incentivizing the BP MDL’s choice of the two 
outcomes offer clues as to why the relevant OCS oil and gas jurisprudence
is so “infamously chaotic.” Commenting on the centuries-long warfare 
between the English common law courts and admiralty courts for control 
over waterborne commerce, for example, 18th century English biographer 
Roger North cautioned that “[i]t is the foible of all judicatures to value 
their own justice and pretend that there is none so exquisite as theirs;
while, at the bottom, it is the profits accruing that sanctify any court’s
authority.”28 
North’s observation sheds light on the BP pro-admiralty outcome if, 
in place of his reference to “profits accruing that sanctify any court’s
authority,” we substitute the dramatic benefits that the BP disaster’s
expeditious resolution secured for the nation’s six-state Gulf region and 
population, its environment, its admiralty bar, and the enhancement of the 
Fifth Circuit’s already considerable prestige as the nation’s leading 
admiralty tribunal. That fealty to non-SRTMA and pro-displacement
jurisprudence might be traded off for these is perhaps unsurprising when
the stakes are as compelling as those in the BP disaster’s exigent setting.
The MDL’s jurisprudential overreach, the prior article advises, has
already begun to be reversed, however, in the Circuit’s later oil spill
litigation unburdened by these exigencies. 29 
There is also the tension between the Supreme Court and the Fifth
Circuit over what the former deems the latter’s expansive view of
“maritime commerce.” This matter traces back to the Court’s 1985 
opinion in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray,30 if not to its 1969 Rodrigue
opinion, which singled out Congress’s flat rejection of an initial OCSLA
bill proposing admiralty law’s governance of events occurring on OCS
situses. The Circuit has rationalized its departure from dissonant Supreme
Court jurisprudence by recourse to its own rules disallowing deviation 
27. See infra text accompanying note 265.
28. Roger North, quoted in 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
558 n.2 (3rd ed. 1927).
29. This trade-off, its sources, and the Fifth Circuit’s apparent reconsideration 
of its pro-displacement posture in subsequent oil spill litigation are discussed in
greater detail in Costonis, supra note 1, at 547–51.
30. 470 U.S. 414, 425 (1985).
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352 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
from prior panel rulings absent an en banc reversal of the same31 or by
evading the dissonance between, for example, BP MDL’s reasoning and 
Congress’s or the Court’s stated requirements.32 
Unstable jurisprudence is also a consequence of sharp divisions 
among Fifth Circuit judges respecting jurisdictional issues posed by OCS
drilling operations.33 There is the further dilemma of having to select a 
31. See Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1990).
32. Illustrative relative to whether the BP blowout met Grubart’s SRTMA
requirement is the BP federal district court’s pre-trial ruling responding
affirmatively on the exclusive basis of Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527 
(5th Cir. 1986), a precedent narrowly focused on an analysis of standards for an
admiralty contract, thereby avoiding altogether the fundamental objections to the
SRTMA ruling raised in the body of this Article. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon” (B1 Bundle), 808 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d sub
nom., In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth Circuit 
compounds the evasion by adding to the lower court’s citation a further citation to
Grubart, which avoids the fundamental elements of the latter’s requirements as set 
forth in this Article. See infra Section II.A. For an illustration of avoidance on the
displacement issue, see Costonis, supra note 1, at 537–38, which highlights the
district court’s spurious distinction between the OPA and general maritime law
claims allegedly premised on the former’s concern only for Robins Drydock-
qualified claims, namely those in which the claimant’s own property is not
physically damaged, rather than including this category alongside claims arising
from physical damage to claimant’s owned property. Compare OPA 
§ 2702(b)(2)(E) (covering Robins Drydock-qualified claims) with OPA 
§ 2702(b)(2)(B) (duplicating maritime law claims, namely those satisfying the
physical damages and claimant ownership requirements duplicated in OPA §
2702(d)(2)(B)). Avoidance of OPA’s express duplication of the general maritime
law claim enables the court to disregard that OPA “speaks directly” to the remedy
afforded by general maritime tort, thereby displacing it under the Supreme Court’s
rulings in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981), and Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
33. See, e.g., conflicts concerning, inter alia, the status of a jack-up drilling 
vessel as an OCSLA situs under OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A) and the status of OCS 
oil and gas drilling activity as a “maritime” activity for purposes of choice of
admiralty or OCSLA-denominated state law as surrogate federal law, as stated in 
the majority opinion (Higginbotham, J.) and the dissenting opinion (Demoss, J.) 
in Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on
other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 
(5th Cir. 2009); the status of OCS drilling operations as SRTMA- or non-
SRTMA-qualified, as asserted in a section of a majority opinion reserved to its 
author (Clement, J.) and in a dissenting opinion (Higginbotham, J.) in Barker v. 
Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2013); PLT step one (location on
an OCSLA situs) as either location on a vessel or offshore facility under 
conventional OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A) guidelines or as the location on which a
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  75 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
   
 
  
   
  
    
 
  
  
 
  
    
     
     
     
     
      
      
   
   
   
    
       
     
     
     
      
     
   
 
 
  
 
   
3532020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
single governing law for a binary activity—OCS resource development— 
featuring undeniable aquatic and terrestrial components. Lying in wait, 
finally, are the complexities of the statutory and judge-made norms and 
the constitutional and practical frameworks in which the norms are to be
selected and applied.
To this observer, what is most striking about the dimensions of the BP 
story recounted here is the tenaciousness with which the Fifth Circuit’s
predisposition to the “reflexive invocation of admiralty jurisdiction” in
the MDL has preserved admiralty law from the very devolution that Judge 
Brown viewed as a fait accompli 30 years ago. In this sense, the BP MDL
belongs at the heroic level, however one might question its conception of
the relation between the pertinent federal statutes and admiralty law
jurisprudence as proper beyond the singular character of the disaster
itself.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................. 354
I. SRTMA, Pippen, and Theriot/Doiron Standards......................... 363
A. The SRTMA/OCSLA Confluence......................................... 364
1. The SRTMA Standard..................................................... 364
2. OCSLA/Rodrigue Standard............................................. 367
B. Pippen Standard..................................................................... 372
C. The Theriot/Doiron Standard ................................................ 377
II. The Macondo Well’s Production Casing and Temporary 
Abandonment Activity: An “Inherently Non-Maritime”/
Non-SRTMA OCS Oil and Gas Operation Service ..................... 381
A. SRTMA/“Inherently Non-Maritime” Activity
in the Fifth Circuit ................................................................. 382
1. Sole Tort Action.............................................................. 383
2. Dual-Status Fixed Platform Action ................................. 384
3. The Tort/Indemnification Action .................................... 387
4. Doiron Redux.................................................................. 392
B. The BP Blowout: A Profile of the Tortious Activity ............. 397
Conclusion.............................................................................399
majority of a contract’s performance will be rendered, as asserted in a majority 
opinion (Davis, J.) or in a dissenting opinion (Garza, J.) in Grand Isle Shipyard,
Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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354 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
INTRODUCTION
This Article is my second in a series contesting key choice of law
outcomes recorded in an eastern federal district court pre-trial
proceeding34 (B1 Bundle) in the BP Multidistrict Litigation (MDL)
following the April 2010 BP Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil well 
blowout. The first of these articles35 questions B1 Bundle’s ruling that
Congress’s adoption of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)36 does not
displace the pre-OPA general maritime marine pollution tort. The article
outlines the ruling’s incompatibility with subsequent federal Fifth Circuit
OPA decisions, one of which, referred to here as Wildlife,37 reappears in 
this Article in a different and more problematic context.38 This Article also 
details the ruling’s discord with the plain meaning of such key OPA
provisions as OPA § 2751(e), which denies admiralty status to maritime
law norms that provide “otherwise” than OPA’s many discordant
commands. It also highlights the United States Supreme Court’s 
constitutional jurisprudence favoring federal statutory displacement of
federal common or maritime law that is inconsistent with or otherwise 
“speaks directly” to issues addressed by the statute.39 
The present Article critiques B1 Bundle’s associated position that 
designates as an admiralty maritime tort the Macondo well blowout that 
occurred during BP’s well-drilling from a vessel, the Deepwater Horizon, 
on the OCS. It contests B1 Bundle’s holding that the BP blowout satisfies
the capstone 1995 Supreme Court ruling in Jerome B. Grubart v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (Grubart)40 conditioning admiralty tort
jurisdiction on a determination that the tort-based activity is “substantially
related to [a] traditional maritime activity”41 (SRTMA), a position the
Court introduced some 23 years earlier in Executive Jet Aviation v. City of
34. See B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, aff’d sub nom., In re Deepwater
Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014).
35. See Costonis, supra note 1.
36. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat 484 (1990) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). 
37. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157. 
38. Wildlife dealt with the question of whether OPA, other federal statutes,
and general maritime law pre-empted state law. The issue addressed in this Article 
is whether the BP blowout is SRTMA-qualified. Wildlife is discussed in relation
to its problematic citation in In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2018).
39. See Costonis, supra note 1, passim.
40. 513 U.S. 527 (1995). The Court’s three prior SRTMA opinions are Sisson 
v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668
(1982); and Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
41. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. 
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3552020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
Cleveland (Executive Jet).42 Finding that the Grubart scenario complied 
with the SRTMA condition, the Court selected federal admiralty law and
jurisdiction over Illinois state law as the proper norm for the Grubart
dispute’s adjudication. 
But for the conflation of admiralty tort standards with admiralty contract
standards in B1 Bundle and the subsequent Fifth Circuit opinions addressed 
below, my SRTMA critique would have commenced by framing the inquiry 
exclusively as it is addressed in the 2011 B1 Bundle pre-trial ruling and 2014
consolidated Limitation of Liability/BP MDL trial,43 which allocated
economic and property liability among the MDL’s principal defendants.
This inquiry centers on whether the faulty management of Macondo well’s
production casing and temporary abandonment operations, the improperly
performed activity accounting for the well blowout, satisfies Grubart’s 
SRTMA requirement.
Featured would be: (1) the Supreme Court’s rationale for adding the 
conceptual SRTMA requirement to its venerable spatial/maritime location 
criterion for admiralty tort jurisdiction; (2) the legislative history of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act44 (OCSLA) and the Supreme Court’s
OCSLA jurisprudence, principally Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. (Rodrigue)45 and Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray (Herb’s Welding),46 as 
both bear on the SRTMA question; (3) OCSLA § 1333(a) choice of law
prescriptions concerning the relative priority of general maritime law in 
relation to relevant federal statutes—principally OCSLA itself and OPA; 
(4) the relevance of the Fifth Circuit’s recurrent portrayal of oil and gas 
drilling and servicing operations as “inherently” or “peculiarly non-
42. 409 U.S. 249 (1973). Executive Jet used the adjective “significant” rather
than “substantial.” Id. at 268.
43. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 
657 (E.D. La. 2014). As explained by the court:
[T]he Phase One trial concerned two cases within this Multidistrict 
Litigation: the Transocean entities’ limitation action . . . and the United 
States’ claims under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 (“OPA”) . . . . The Phase One trial addressed fault allocation
for the loss of well control, blowout, explosion, fire, and oil spill. This
includes determining if any Defendant engaged in misconduct in excess 
of ordinary negligence. The Phase One trial also addressed Transocean’s 
limitation defense, as well as various claims and defenses between and 
among the several Defendants. 
Id. at 730 (internal citations omitted).
44. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2009)).
45. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
46. 470 U.S. 414 (1985).
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356 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
maritime”; and (5) the BP MDL court’s findings of fact and law in the
2014 liability trial.
The Article will pursue this roadmap, following a review of the Fifth
Circuit’s conflation of the SRTMA tort standard with a predecessor tort
and two contract standards in pertinent maritime oil and gas litigation. Apt 
examples of both are furnished in B1 Bundle, Wildlife, and In re Doiron
(Doiron),47 the latter of which is a 2018 Fifth Circuit en banc decision that
reformulated the circuit’s admiralty contract standard for these operations.
B1 Bundle, for example, extolls one of the circuit’s leading contract 
decisions, Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp. (Theriot), 48 as its exclusive
authority for its single-sentence claim that “[t]he operations of the 
DEEPWATER HORIZON bore a substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity,” quoting, in a parenthetical appended to Theriot’s 
citation, that “oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is
recognized to be maritime commerce.”49 
The Fifth Circuit, upon review, then compounds the conflation by 
joining Grubart, the most recent exponent of SRTMA as an admiralty tort
jurisdiction standard, with Theriot, the admiralty contract standard 
opinion, in its affirmation that: 
A strong argument exists for the proposition that the [BP] disaster
occurred while the [Deepwater Horizon] vessel was engaged in 
the maritime activity of conducting offshore drilling operations, 
and the disaster had a significant effect on maritime commerce.
Cf. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
513 U.S. 527 passim, . . . (1995) (maritime law applies to damages
where drill barge flooded underwater tunnel and buildings on river
bank); Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538–39 (5th
Cir. 1986).50 
This Article disputes the propriety of their co-citation in light of their 
status as exemplars of the opposite ends of the binary tort/contract divide. 
It also exposes the differences dividing Grubart’s “repair or maintenance
work on a[n in-state] navigable waterway performed from a vessel,”51 the 
case’s SRTMA-qualified tort, from BP’s wrongful activity—faulty casing
47. 879 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
48. 783 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1986). 
49. See B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d sub nom.,
In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014).
50. 745 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2014). 
51. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 528 (1995).
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3572020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
and temporary abandonment of a well in the subsoil52 and on the seabed53 
of the OCS, a federal enclave in which the competing norms are not
Grubart’s admiralty law versus state law at all, but federal statutory law, 
selected by OCSLA § 1333(a)(1)54 and judge-made maritime law. 
Theriot and B1 Bundle/Wildlife return in Doiron, which advances its 
two-step formulation of an admiralty contract standard within the overall
premise that marine oil and gas operations are “maritime commerce” to
replace the six-factor test defined in the Fifth Circuit’s 1990 decision in
Davis & Sons Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. (Davis):55 “Is the contract one to 
provide services to facilitate the drilling or production of oil and gas on
navigable waters?”56 If so, “does the contract provide or do the parties 
expect that a vessel will play a substantial role in the completion of the
contract?”57 
Doiron invokes Theriot by observing that the latter’s evaluation of a 
contract for supplying a submersible drilling barge was ”clearly
maritime,” because “‘[o]il and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a
vessel is recognized to be maritime commerce.’”58 But it also brings
Wildlife and, implicitly, B1 Bundle back into the picture by referencing the
incomplete admiralty contract standard of an oil spill that “‘occurred while 
the vessel . . . was engaged in the maritime activity of conducting offshore
drilling operations.’”59 
Unstated both in Doiron and in B1 Bundle/Wildlife is that the phrase
Theriot and Doiron employ to anchor their choice of law—“oil and gas 
drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is recognized to be maritime 
commerce”—paraphrases the standard articulated in Pippen v. Shell Oil 
Co. (“Pippen”),60 a maritime tort case. Pippen employs it to resolve a
dispute concerning an employee’s entitlement to compensation under the 
52. The subsoil is referred to as a “well bore.”
53. The seabed is referred to as a “wellhead.”
54. See infra text accompanying note 265.
55. 919 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1990). 
56. In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2018). 
57. Id.
58. Id. at 575 (quoting Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538–39 
(5th Cir. 1986)).
59. Id. at 575 (quoting In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 
2014)).
60. 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981). Pippen’s formulation is that “[s]ince
offshore drilling—the discovery, recovery, and sale of oil and natural gas from
the sea bottom—is maritime commerce, it follows that the purpose of Pippen’s
work was to facilitate maritime commerce.” Id. at 384. (emphasis added). 
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358 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).61 At issue
was whether the employee, injured while engaging in wireline operator
activities, qualified for compensation under the LHWCA’s “maritime
employment” status requirement.62 
The answer, the Fifth Circuit panel stated, turns on whether the
employee’s activities had a “realistically significant relationship to . . . 
maritime activity,”63 which requires that “the purpose of the employee’s
activities is to facilitate maritime commerce.”64 “Since offshore drilling
the discovery, recovery, and sale of oil and natural gas from the sea
bottom is maritime commerce,” the court decreed, “it follows that the 
purpose of Pippen’s work was to facilitate maritime commerce,” hence 
confirming that the work “had a realistically significant relationship to
maritime commerce.”65 
In these opening pages, four standards have already been encountered, 
two for admiralty torts and two for admiralty contracts. The former include
Grubart’s SRTMA conceptual standard and Pippen’s realistically
significant relationship to the maritime commerce principle.66 The two 
contract standards are those set forth in Davis & Sons’s six-factor test67 
and in Theriot/Doiron’s68 joinder of maritime oil and gas operations
conceived as “maritime commerce” with the substantiality of a vessel’s
role in the contract’s performance. Account must also be taken in both the
61. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901–950 (West 2018).
62. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 902(3), which defines an “employee” as “any person
engaged in maritime employment.”
63. Pippen, 661 F.2d at 382 (quoting Mississippi Coast Marine, Inc. v. 
Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1981)).
64. Id. at 383–84.
65. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
66. A subsidiary tort standard referenced in B1 Bundle is the Admiralty 
Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101, which covers “injury or damage, to person or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even though the injury or
damage is done or consummated on land.” 
67. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1990). Davis
& Sons enumerates the following six factors: content of the specific work order;
work actually done by crew; work performed aboard a vessel on navigable waters; 
relation of work being done to vessel’s mission; principal work of injured worker; 
work actually being performed by injured worker. Id. at 316.
68. Although the conceptual relationship of the two opinions is subject to
ambiguities discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 243–59, both 
include the elements of marine oil and gas operations conducted from a vessel on
navigable waters as “maritime commerce” and of the contractual expectation and
actuality of the vessel’s “substantial” engagement of a vessel in the contract’s
performance.
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3592020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
tort and contract contexts of whether the litigated event occurred within 
territorial waters or on the OCS.69 The latter is of particular consequence 
in the BP blowout scenario because its occurrence on the OCS brings 
OCSLA’s choice of law rules directly into play, a development that, in
conjunction with Grubart’s SRTMA principle, compromises the status of
the BP blowout as SRTMA-compliant.
Part I offers an analysis of the standards’ rationales as a basis for 
disentangling them and ensures that the proper one is matched with B1 
Bundle. Focus will center on Grubart’s SRTMA, Pippen’s “realistically 
significant relationship to maritime . . . commerce,”70 and 
Theriot/Doiron’s maritime commerce/substantiality of vessel presence.
Tort law’s venerable location standard needs no further elaboration, and
Davis & Sons’s six-factor test bears only brief notice because it has been
overtaken by Theriot/Doiron. Standards beyond SRTMA have been 
pursued for the specific purpose of demonstrating that neither the Pippen
admiralty tort nor the derivative Theriot/Doiron admiralty contract
standard should be conflated or confused with SRTMA. 
There is also the question of whether Theriot/Doiron can be or, as the 
product of decisions addressing events on state territorial waters, need to
be accommodated with OCSLA’s legislative history, the Supreme Court’s
Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding opinions, and the Fifth Circuit’s resort to
Herb’s Welding in Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Engineering Inc.
(PLT),71 which calls for “constru[ing] Theriot narrowly and constru[ing] it 
to its facts.”72 Either individually or in concert with one another, these
decisions and the support they derive from OCSLA’s legislative history 
are not conclusively compatible with the Theriot/Doiron standard.73 
Moreover, they discredit Pippen, whose rationale is featured in this Article
because it has largely gravitated to Doiron through Theriot. Other than the
two issues posed later in Section II(A)(4),74 these not inconsiderable 
concerns are left for exploration elsewhere.
Broadly conceived, the Fifth Circuit’s contemporary treatment of
these standards reflects the gradual confluence of what initially were
separate SRTMA and OCSLA stories. A striking, even prophetic,
exception effectively acknowledging that both are joined at the hip is the
69. See infra text accompanying notes 114–39.
70. Pippen, 661 F.2d at 382 (quoting Mississippi Coast Marine, Inc. v. 
Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1981)).
71. Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng’g, Inc., 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.
1990).
72. Id. at 1059.
73. See infra Section I.C.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 242–58.
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360 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Court’s attention in its 1973 Executive Jet opinion to its 1969 landmark
OCSLA opinion in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
(Rodrigue).75 Rodrigue distinguished itself by looking to OCSLA to 
reverse two Fifth Circuit decisions applying admiralty law to accidents 
occurring on OCS stationary platforms, thereby effectively overruling the 
Circuit’s 1961 decision in Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes,76 which applied 
admiralty law to these accidents. Executive Jet both noted that Rodrigue
concerned the “maritime or non-maritime nature of the tort and its 
relationship to maritime navigation” and rebuffed the Fifth Circuit’s
choice of admiralty law because “the accidents bore no relation to any
navigational function.”77 The quoted language functionally parallels the 
SRTMA principle stated as such or in terms of the activity’s “inherently
non-maritime” character that was destined to be repeated in one form or
another in scores of Fifth Circuit marine oil and gas decisions following
Executive Jet.78 
Use of the SRTMA phrase was ignored altogether in Herb’s Welding, 
which in my judgment began an ultimately successful process of extending
both OCSLA and Rodrigue well beyond what might be called the 
“reductive” interpretation of Rodrigue blessed by the Fifth Circuit then 
and now.79 Under the reductionist perception, Congress deemed stationary 
drilling platforms “artificial islands,”80 which were never subject to
admiralty law in the first place. Hence, other situses such as drilling barges
and semi-submersibles that, as vessels, had engaged with admiralty law
pre-OCSLA continued to do so by virtue of admiralty law’s presence “of
its own force”81 post-OCSLA. So viewed, OCSLA exacts nothing from 
admiralty law, just as B1 Bundle views OPA as leaving pre-OPA admiralty
75. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
76. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
77. Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 258–59. 
78. See, e.g., cases collected in Section II.A.1–3.
79. Walsh v. Seagull Energy Corp., 836 F. Supp. 411, 415 (S.D. Tex. 1993) 
explains the rationale for the Circuit’s position:
The legislative history of [OCSLA] clearly shows that Congress intended
to preempt the application of maritime law to activities on platforms on 
the OCS. Unfortunately for the sake of clarity, however, the statute itself
does not say this. Rather, the statute boiled down says only that federal
law applies on OCS oilfield structures, and that gaps in the federal law
there will be filled by the law of the adjacent state. Nothing is said about
the inapplicability of maritime law. This silence leaves open the
possibility that, where the pre-existing maritime law would have already
applied on the OCS, OCSLA added nothing.
80. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969).
81. See id.
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3612020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
tort law undiminished. Both results are quite remarkable assertions of the
primacy of federal lower court judge-made law over the contrary 
prescriptions of Congress or the Supreme Court in the instances cited. 
Herb’s Welding might have dismissed admiralty law simply by
pointing out that, as a welder assigned to maintain OCS stationary 
platforms, Gray was working on one of those “artificial islands.”82 But the
case also engaged the LHWCA, a statute Gray invoked to obtain 
compensation for his injuries providing that his status as a worker
constituted “maritime employment.”83 It came to the Court from a Fifth 
Circuit opinion,84 which decided the dispute in Gray’s favor solely as an
LHWCA dispute dealing with a platform based in state waters even though 
the gas field on which Gray worked included OCS statutory platforms.
The Circuit employed the tort test Pippen had derived from a prior Fifth 
Circuit precedent: namely, whether Gray’s work “bore a realistically
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity involving
navigation and commerce of navigable waters.”85 As noted, it directly 
cited to and quoted Pippen’s identification of oil and gas drilling with
“maritime commerce.”86 
Since Part I explores in depth the Supreme Court’s nullification of the 
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and result, it is sufficient here to gauge Herb’s
Welding’s pivotal role in the OCSLA story on the basis of the Supreme
Court’s response to its question of whether there was anything “inherently
maritime” about Gray’s tasks as a welder maintaining stationary 
platforms.87 No, the Court concluded with a clear eye on OCSLA’s
legislative history and its previous Rodrigue opinion, because these tasks
“are also performed on land, and their nature is not significantly altered by
the marine environment, particularly since exploration and development
of the Continental Shelf are not themselves maritime commerce.”88 
Thus, the core of this Article’s anti-SRTMA position in relation to the
BP blowout: namely, the disqualification under SRTMA of oil and gas
services deemed “inherently non-maritime” as mirrored, in turn, byHerb’s
82. A second, independent ground for the same result is that the oil and gas
service operations conducted on fixed platforms are not SRTMA-compliant when 
deemed inherently non-maritime. See infra Section II.A.2.
83. See LHWCA § 902(2).
84. Herb’s Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1985). 
85. Id. at 179 (citing Mississippi Coast Marine, Inc. v. Bosarge, 637 F.2d 994, 
998 (5th Cir. 1981)).
86. Id. at 180. 
87. Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 425 (1985).
88. Id.
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362 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Welding’s conception of these same services as remote from “traditional
maritime activities.” 
The OCSLA situs in Herb’s Welding was the stationary platform on
which Gray worked as a welder. Rodrigue ruled admiralty law out of
bounds for such platforms in what I have termed its reductionist
interpretation because Congress treated the platforms as “islands” to 
which admiralty law does not apply despite the artificiality of this 
designation.89 The Supreme Court’s labeling in Herb’s Welding of Gray’s
work as “inherently non-maritime” opens up a second route to admiralty
law’s non-application to Gray’s platform, namely non-compliance with
the SRTMA principle the Court had earlier implicitly acknowledged in 
Executive Jet. This innovation is largely overlooked by commentators and 
by the Fifth Circuit itself, which has premised Herb’s Welding’s outcome 
solely on its status as a stationary platform.90 
But there is more. If the inherently non-maritime nature of a stationary 
platform activity provides a basis independent of a platform’s “island” 
status to bar admiralty law’s application to it, why wouldn’t the same be
true for non-maritime activities conducted on and from vessels? The 
answer preceding Executive Jet was clear: blockage by the location
principle whereby, excluding the Admiralty Extension Act exception,
admiralty law governs activities occurring on navigable waters regardless 
of their nature.91 But Executive Jet more than intimated the severity of
SRTMA’s qualification of admiralty law’s prior location principle by its 
non-reductive interpretation of Rodrigue. As earlier noted, Executive Jet
states that Rodrigue addressed the “maritime or non-maritime nature of
the tort and its relationship to maritime navigation” and, more to the point
for this Article’s purpose, precluded the Fifth Circuit’s choice of admiralty
law because “the accidents bore no relation to any navigational 
function.”92 
Looking back at a half century’s evolution of the Fifth Circuit’s
SRTMA jurisprudence, one can see more clearly now than in the early 
1970s Rodrigue’s and Herb’s Welding’s generative role in reshuffling 
choice of law outcomes in oil and gas litigation.
89. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 362 (1969). 
90. See opinions cited in David W. Robertson, Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law Issues in OCS Oil Spill Cases, 59 LA. B.J. 344 (2012). For subsequent
discussion of this issue, see infra Section II.A.2.
91. The Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 740, extends to injuries
suffered on land but caused by a vessel on navigable water.
92. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 258–59
(1972).
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One way to frame the inquiry is to devote Part I to a review of the 
SRTMA, Pippen, and Doiron concepts. Are they asking the same or
different questions? Are their rationales so fungible as to render defensible
B1 Bundle’s reliance on Theriot’s contract standard to justify its portrayal 
of the BP blowout tort as SRTMA-qualified? Useful for context in Part II 
as well are highlights of OCSLA’s legislative history, further
consideration of Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding as both bear on Pippen, 
and the roles of OCSLA § 1333(a) and a so-called PLT three-step test as
choice of law analytical vehicles.
Part II concludes that different questions are being asked, that SRTMA
is not fungible with the other two standards, and that the Supreme Court
severely undermined the Pippen standard in Herb’s Welding. Part II also
briefly surveys Fifth Circuit jurisprudence addressing the role of the 
SRTMA principle as it bears on choice of law issues in marine oil and gas 
disputes. Included are the principle’s role in simple tort actions as well as
in related third-party actions premised on indemnity contract claims,
where the question becomes whether the contracts should be governed by 
admiralty or non-admiralty law. Consistent with Justice Souter’s counsel 
in Grubart that the SRTMA determination must address the “given 
case,”93 Part II concludes by confirming the non-SRTMA status of the BP
blowout scenario, primarily with the aid of the very conclusions of fact
and law declared in the 2014 trial that allocated fault among the principal 
BP MDL defendants.
I. SRTMA, PIPPEN, AND THERIOT/DOIRON STANDARDS
The gradual confluence of the SRTMA and OCSLA stories anchors
this Article’s position opposing B1 Bundle’s holding that the BP blowout
satisfied the SRTMA standard. Both stories are told below. I have divided 
them into separate subsections because, however much each reinforces the
other, their evolution and sources are distinct. Grubart and its three
SRTMA predecessors are silent on OCSLA, for example, because their
events all occurred in non-OCS state waters. Grubart addresses its tortious 
event’s claim to admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1),
moreover, while OCSLA § 1333(a) focuses on choice of law, leaving 
OCSLA jurisdiction to § 1349(b)(1).
Under OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A), torts occurring on stationary
platforms are not governed under admiralty law because this provision 
vests governance in adjacent state law unless admiralty law is deemed to
93. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 542 (1995).
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364 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
apply of its own force. But the SRTMA principle provides an independent 
basis for the same result, namely that the operations conducted from 
stationary drilling platforms fail under the principle, thereby effacing 
admiralty law and jurisdiction altogether. Finally, Grubart’s SRTMA
principle governs admiralty tort jurisdiction in both territorial and 
superadjacent OCS waters, while OCSLA presumably addresses choice of
law issues in an OCS setting only.
Dividing the two stories is somewhat awkward because many of the 
same opinions not only figure in both stories, but are present as well in this
Article’s portrayal of the Pippen and Theriot/Doiron standards. Such is the 
labyrinthine nature of oil and gas operations’ binary marine and terrestrial 
component, and the decades-long tension between the Fifth Circuit and the 
Supreme Court over which of the two merits priority in fashioning choice
of law outcomes.
A. The SRTMA/OCSLA Confluence
1. The SRTMA Standard
Grubart cuts to the chase in defining the SRTMA test as one that
“turns on the comparison of traditional maritime activity to the arguably 
maritime character of the tortfeasor’s activity in a given case.”94 The
keynote of the relationship is the similarity or resemblance of the pairings.
Grubart, for example, emphasized this factor in the wrongfully conducted
activity before it—“repair or maintenance work on a navigable waterway 
performed from a vessel”95—with marine practices employing “barges
and similar vessels [that] have traditionally been engaged in repair work
similar to [that] . . . contracted to perform here.”96 
Several features are noteworthy in this definition. One is that the unit
of comparison with traditional maritime activity is the “activity giving rise
to the incident,”97 as described above in Grubart, or, as exemplified in 
other of the Court’s SRTMA decisions, the “negligent operation of a 
vessel on navigable waters,”98 or the “storage and maintenance of a vessel 
at a marina on navigable waters.”99 These portrayals are formulated neither 
as “hypergeneralization[s],”100 nor as narrow descriptions of the “precise
94. Id.
95. Id. at 540.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982).
99. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 365 (1990).
100. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 542.
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3652020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
cause”101 of the incident, but as “the general conduct from which the
incident arose.”102 
Another is that less remoteness between the paired elements affords 
greater assurance that selecting admiralty law to govern the activity will
not be arbitrary because the “reasons for applying special admiralty rules
would apply in the suit at hand.”103 The elements’ similarity increases the
likelihood that admiralty’s traditional and long-term experience with the
same activity will contribute wizened expertise respecting governance of
its faulty performance. Hence Justice Stewart’s observation in Executive 
Jet, which declined to apply admiralty law to an airplane crash in Lake 
Erie: 
Through long experience, the law of the sea knows how to
determine whether a particular ship is seaworthy, and it knows the
nature of maintenance and cure. It is concerned with maritime
liens, the general average, captures and prizes, limitation of
liability, cargo damages, and claims for salvage.104 
Justice Stewart concluded: “[Admiralty] [r]ules and concepts . . . are wholly
alien to air commerce. The matters with which admiralty is basically
concerned have no conceivable bearing on the operation of aircraft . . . .”105 
Implicit in Justice Stewart’s reasoning is the reverse, namely that the 
expertise that admiralty law lacks is the very expertise that aviation science
and practice enjoy, such that these, not admiralty law, are guardrails that 
aid in selecting an appropriate governing law. Restricting SRTMA to 
“traditional” maritime activity, moreover, reinforces the Court’s
prescription favoring the mature expertise on the admiralty side that is so 
valued by its SRTMA rationale. This portrayal is demonstrably false when
predicated on admiralty law’s supposed awareness and facility in dealing 
with the emerging technology, practice, and policy dimensions of OCS oil
and gas operations when OCSLA was adopted in 1953106 and in the 
decades to follow.
Much the same can be said of admiralty’s distance from the complex
environmental and public health and safety considerations resulting from 
101. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 365.
102. Id. at 364.
103. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 539–40.
104. Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 270 (1972).
105. Id.
106. SeeWarren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key
to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1953) (outlining the novelty of the OCS
oil and gas initiative in the mid-20th century and Congress’s effort to initiate an 
appropriate legal framework for its governance in OCSLA, as adopted in 1953).
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366 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
OCSLA’s comprehensive 1978 revision to correct the 1953 version’s
single-minded focus on exploiting the OCS’s mineral wealth.107 
Congress’s remedial efforts are also expressed concomitantly in the Clean 
Water Act and, most directly in the case of marine oil discharges, in OPA.
Well off the mark is any suggestion that the judge-made general maritime
law’s simplistic negligence tort is a match for these complexities, on which
Congress, the U.S. Department of the Interior, and related agencies have
labored for decades.
Depending upon the facts, Executive Jet also cautions, the strict
location test may be “impossible to apply with any degree of certainty,” as 
evidenced in that case’s scenario of a plane crash resulting from the 
ingestion of seagulls by the plane’s engines as it rose above its Cleveland 
runway but crashed in nearby Lake Erie.108 “Under the locality test,” 
Justice Stewart observes, “the tort ‘occurs’ where the alleged negligence
took effect, and in the case of aircraft that locus is often most difficult to
determine”109 because, “unlike waterborne vessels, they are not restrained 
by one-dimensional geographic and physical boundaries.”110 Finding
SRTMA the source of a more cogent resolution of the question, the Court
concluded: “In the view we take of the question before us we need not 
decide who has the better of [a] dispute [driven by the location 
principle].”111 The challenge under OPA or maritime law of determining
where and when the discharge resulting from the BP blowout occurred— 
below the OCS seabed, at the OCS seabed, or descending from the 
Deepwater Horizon—is one of the BP blowout’s genuine imponderables
and most persuasive reasons for denying it SRTMA status.112 
Finally, SRTMA is one of Grubart’s three independent tests, the other 
two being the potential to disrupt maritime commerce and, along with
SRTMA, the location of the allegedly wrongful activity on navigable 
waters. Disruption and location are not featured in this Article because
their satisfaction in the BP scenario is broadly conceded. But SRTMA’s
separateness from the disruption and location measures is of primary 
107. For an account of these revisions, see John Costonis, The Macondo Well 
Blowout: Taking the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Seriously, 42 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 511, 540–44 (2011).
108. Exec. Jet, 409 U.S. at 266.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 268.
111. Id. at 267.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 278–83.
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3672020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
importance because proof of the independent SRTMA variable is essential
to a finding that the BP blowout is an admiralty tort.113 
The admiralty contract measure, we have already seen and will see
again, fuses the elements of: (1) conducting oil and gas operations;
(2) from a vessel inextricably engaged in the pertinent contract’s
performance; (3) on navigable water; and (4) under an overall mantle of
“maritime commerce.” Grubart, on the other hand, goes the other way by
narrowing its concern to location, a non-issue in B1 Bundle and Wildlife, 
and to the SRTMA connection test alone. Hence, Grubart defines—and
isolates—the “activity giving rise to the incident” as the unit to be 
compared with a traditional maritime activity. If this granular activity
meets the SRTMA resemblance link and if it also meets the location 
requirement, the tort is within admiralty jurisdiction. If not, the tort falls
outside of admiralty jurisdiction even if the location and disruption 
requirements are met.
2. OCSLA/Rodrigue Standard
The SRTMA story both reinforces and is reinforced by the OCSLA 
story, as reflected in OCSLA’s legislative history, the statute’s choice of
law prescriptions in OCSLA §§ 1333(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A), and the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding, among others.
The point of the OCSLA/Rodrigue story is plain enough even if 
tracing it through these sources is not. Reviewing the 1953 OCSLA
hearings,114 the Supreme Court definitively confirmed Congress’s 
recognition that admiralty law is an unfortunate choice to govern OCS
tortious oil and gas servicing activities. It observed that Congress “was
acutely aware of the inaptness of admiralty law,” particularly highlighting
113. The structure of Justice Souter’s treatment of the SRTMA issue in 
Grubart precisely reflects the foregoing division between the two SRTMA
components, which appear in the opinion at Part B, pp. 534–35 (location/vessel)
and Part C, pp. 538–40 (SRTMA). Midway through Part B, the Court states that
“[b]ecause the injuries suffered by Grubart and the other flood victims were
caused by a vessel on navigable water, the location enquiry would seem to be at
an end . . . .” Part C opens with the sentence: “We now turn to the maritime 
connection enquiries.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock 
Co., 513 U.S. 527, 539 (1995). Only then does the opinion restate and undertake 
to resolve the SRTMA inquiry.
114. For a more detailed discussion of the pertinent elements of OCSLA’s
legislative history, see Costonis, supra note 107, at 526–34.
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368 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
that OCSLA “applied the same law to the seabed and subsoil as . . . to the
artificial islands, and admiralty law was obviously unsuited to that task.”115 
The Court also singled out witness testimony that “[m]aritime law in
the strict sense has never had to deal with the resources in the ground
beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill adapted for that purpose.”116 It 
reasoned that “[s]ince the Act treats seabed, subsoil and artificial islands
the same, . . . the most sensible interpretation of Congress’ reaction to this
testimony is that admiralty treatment was eschewed altogether.”117 
These quotes demonstrate that the OCSLA statute, like the Truman
Proclamation118 it implements, overwhelmingly focuses on one objective
and the location at which it is to be achieved: the exploitation of the OCS’s
terrestrial mineral resources on or below the OCS seabed. Whether a
vessel or stationary platform is employed for drilling purposes hardly
competes as other than incidental to these two factors, except regarding 
remedies for seamen or workers injured or killed while engaged in the
extraction effort. Hence the expert witness’s testimony in Senate 
procedures relating to the LHWCA 1972 amendments:
“Irrespective of design [, that is,] bottom resting, semi-
submersible, or full floating,” these [drilling platforms] perform
only as a base from which the drilling industry conducts its
operations. The operations, once the structure is in place, are no
different from that which takes place on dry land. All of the
equipment and methods utilized in the drilling operations are
identical to our land based operations.119 
This is the perspective on the exploitation of the OCS’s mineral wealth
that undergirds the force of the Supreme Court’s observation that OCSLA
“applied the same law to the seabed and subsoil as . . . to the artificial
islands, and admiralty law was obviously unsuited to that task.”120 
The issues associated with the injury or death of one or several seamen
or OCS platform workers should be addressed in their own terms, rather
than entangled with the resolution of property and economic claims of tens
115. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co. 395 U.S. 352, 364–65 (1969).
116. Id. at 365 n.12.
117. Id.
118. Truman Proclamation No. 2776, 10 Fed. Reg. 13, 303 (Sep. 28, 1945);
Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. 12, 305, 1945 WL 3400 (Sep. 29, 1945). 
119. Hearings on S. 2318 et al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 410–11 
(1972) (Statement of General Counsel, International Association of Drilling 
Contractors).
120. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 365–66.
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3692020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
of thousands of Gulf residents or enterprises, the vast majority of which
are located inland from the Gulf states’ coast. The failure to distinguish
between the two is among the most fundamental illustrations of the BP
MDL litigation’s admiraltycentric bent.
A similar message derives from the confusion of the Exxon Valdez
event, properly identified as a “spill,” with the BP well “blowout.”
Without doubt, admiralty law was the right choice for assigning private 
rights and duties in the pre-OPA Exxon Valdez spill—an event engaging 
a vessel in state waters transporting a cargo of oil across the ocean’s 
surface.121 But the BP oil and gas blowout, which stemmed from loss of
well control in a well bore located on the Mississippi Canyon 5,760-acre 
lease block some 15,200 feet below the OCS with a total depth of 20,200
feet from the wellhead to the Deepwater Horizon deck,122 is literally in 
another environment than the Valdez spill, which splendidly illustrates an
activity that bears a “substantial relationship to a traditional maritime
activity.”123 Congress clearly had this difference in mind when it amended 
OCSLA in 1978 to include § 1332(6)’s “Congressional declaration of 
policy” that “operations in the [OCS] should be conducted . . . to prevent 
or minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well control, fires, . . . or 
other occurrences which may cause damage to the environment or to
property, or . . . life or health.”124 
The same message of admiralty law’s constrained role in the OCS oil 
and gas exploitation picture is detailed both in the legislative history and
wording of OCSLA §§ 1333(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A), which provide as
follows:
(a)(1). The Constitution and the laws . . . of the United States are 
extended to the subsoil and seabed of the [OCS] and to all artificial
islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or
temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon
for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing 
resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other
than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such
121. Costonis, supra note 1, disputes the B1 Bundle position that the general
maritime marine pollution tort was not displaced by OPA’s adoption in 1990.
122. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 657,
671 (E.D. La. 2014).
123. Because the Valdez spill occurred in state waters, OCSLA was
inapplicable. Had the spill been on waters above the OCS, however, remediation
of qualified, privately incurred economic damages would have been assigned to 
admiralty tort law in the year preceding OCSLA’s adoption. 
124. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(6) (2018).
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370 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
resources, to the same extent as if the [OCS] were an area of
exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a state.
(a)(2)(A). To the extent that they are applicable and not
inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and
regulations of the Secretary . . . , the civil and criminal laws of
each adjacent State, . . . are declared to be the law of the United
States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer
Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures
erected thereon, which would be within the area of Shelf . . .
(emphasis added).
As conceived by OCSLA’s drafters, their work envisaged formulation 
of a choice of law framework featuring three different normative choices 
and a two-stage process.125 At the outset of the hearings, the alternatives
included federal non-admiralty law, federal admiralty law, and state law. 
The drafters selected admiralty law in the original Senate bill, which 
declared that “[a]ll acts occurring . . . on any structure (other than a vessel), 
which is located on the [OCS] or on the waters above the [OCS] . . . shall 
be adjudicated . . . according to the laws relating to such acts or offenses
occurring on vessels of the United States on the high seas.”126 But this
alternative was decisively rejected in no small part, Rodrigue confirms,
because of testimony declaring that admiralty law “never had to deal with
the resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill
adapted for that purpose,”127 which the Supreme Court concluded rendered 
“sensible” the interpretation that “Congress’ reaction” was to “eschew
[admiralty treatment] altogether.”128 
State law as such also failed to garner the necessary support, even 
though it comprehensively managed the civil and criminal issues likely to
arise among drilling platform workers from states adjacent to these drilling 
platforms. Objections to state law included the status of the OCS as
“uniquely an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction and control,”129 as well
125. See Costonis, supra note 107, at 530–33.
126. Outer Continental Shelf: Hearings on S. 1901 Before the S. Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong. 2 (1953) [hereinafter Insular Hearings]. 
127. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 365 n.12 (1969)
(quoting Insular Hearings, supra note 126, at 668 (Statement of Richard Young 
Esq. Member of the New York State Bar)).
128. Id. at 365 n.12.
129. See 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).
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3712020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
as the impropriety for the conduct of the nation’s foreign policy of
“intermingling of national and international rights in the area.”130 
Nevertheless, Congress established state law’s priority over admiralty 
law in a compromise the Supreme Court described as having been
achieved by “dropping the treatment of [fixed drilling structures] as
‘vessels.’”131 The compromise neither pertained to nor was designed to
accommodate admiralty law, which Congress appeared to have eliminated
from consideration by this step.132 Rather, it focused on state law and non-
admiralty federal law. The compromise transformed the OCSLA-selected
state law into surrogate federal law when appropriate to do so under 
OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A).
Senator Condon, who presided over the Senate’s definitive rejection 
of admiralty law and superintended the bill that became OCSLA 1953,
confirmed this format in his statement that:
To carry out the primary purpose of the measure, a body of law is
extended [under OCSLA § 1333(a)(1)] to the outer shelf area,
consisting of: (a) The constitution and the laws . . . of the Federal
Government; . . . and (c) in the absence of such applicable Federal
law . . . , the civil and criminal laws of the State adjacent to the
outer shelf area [under OCSLA sec. 1333(a)(2)(A)].133 
A two-stage process implements this format. The first determines
whether applicable federal non-admiralty law exists; if so, it applies. If a
gap in federal law leaves the matter uncovered,134 however, the second 
step employs as surrogate federal law OCSLA-endorsed state law that is 
not itself “inconsistent” with other federal law. As noted, OCSLA
§ 1333(a)(1) addresses the first step; OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A) addresses
the second.
Taking this apparent restriction on OCSLA’s election of adjacent state
law into account, the Fifth Circuit approved the following three-part test 
in Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Engineering, Inc. (PLT):
(1) The controversy must arise on a situs covered by OCSLA (i.e.,
the subsoil, seabed, or [artificial] structures permanently or
temporarily attached thereto). (2) Federal maritime law must not
apply of its own force. (3) The state law must not be inconsistent 
130. Id.
131. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 365.
132. Walsh v. Seagull Energy Corp., 836 F. Supp. 411, 415 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
133. S. REP. NO. 83-411, at 2 (1953) (emphasis added).
134. See Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 357; Nations v. Morris, 183 F.2d 577, 585 (5th 
Cir. 1973). 
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372 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
with Federal law.”135 
Working through the three steps is standard in conventional OCSLA oil 
and gas litigation136 conducted under OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A). Litigants
seeking to avoid admiralty law’s selection in this process commonly deny 
that activity on the basis of which admiralty law is deemed to “apply of its
own force“ doesn’t merit admiralty status.137 
But the BP scenario, properly understood, doesn’t follow the
conventional Fifth Circuit model138 because OCSLA § 1333(a)(1)
provides the appropriate choice of law clause, not § 1333(a)(2)(A). As 
already observed, recourse to the latter is called for only when there is a 
gap. But no gap exists for remediating the property and economic damages
addressed in B1 Bundle. OPA not only duplicates the relevant prior general
maritime law damages requirements but substantially expands its OPA §
2702(b) category of damages well beyond the general maritime law
remedy.139 
B. Pippen Standard
Although deemed the Pippen test, this Article’s account of the test’s
formulation and its later disparagement by the Supreme Court flows from
two Fifth Circuit’s decisions, Pippen140 and Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. 
Gray,141 and the Supreme Court’s effective reversal of the latter opinion.
Pippen, an employee of Superior Electric, was injured in Louisiana
waters while performing wireline services on Inland Well’s drilling barge.
Inland Well brought a third-party action for indemnity against Superior 
Electric in the event the court declared it liable to Pippen. Superior Electric
sought dismissal of Inland Well’s complaint, arguing that LHWCA
§ 905(b) forbade such actions by a vessel owner against the employer of 
an injured employee caused by the negligence of the vessel. Inland Well
135. 895 F.2d 1043, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990).
136. Although OCSLA plays a central role in the BP OCS litigation as well,
the more appropriate choice in the BP scenario is § 1333(a)(1), rather than
§ 1333(a)(2)(A). See infra text accompanying notes 275–77. If not, the default
choice is adjacent state (Louisiana) law pursuant to OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A). In
either case, admiralty law is an inappropriate choice. 
137. See, e.g., Texaco Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co.,
448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2006); Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340 
(5th Cir. 1999). 
138. The Fifth Circuit model is detailed in Costonis, supra note 107, at 530–34.
139. See Costonis, supra note 1, passim.
140. Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1981).
141. 703 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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3732020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
responded that Superior Electric was not entitled to the LHWCA § 905(b)
bar because Pippen’s performance of wireline services did not qualify his
work as “maritime employment” under LHWCA § 902(3). 
The court, which described Pippen’s suit as a “maritime tort action,”142 
ruled for Superior Electric. Its reasoning matched the court’s enumeration 
of the Pippen test’s elements for “maritime employment.” As already
noted, the formula requires that the plaintiff’s work must have a 
realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime activity
involving navigation and commerce on navigable waters. The court then
offered its perception of the match between these elements and the Pippen
scenario itself. 
Pippen worked, the court began, as a wireline operator at the time of
his injury. His responsibilities were essential both to the function of the
vessel and to the completion of the offshore drilling process. The court
concluded that: “Since offshore drilling the discovery, recovery, and sale
of oil and natural gas from the sea bottom” is maritime commerce, “it
follows that the purpose of Pippen’s work was to facilitate maritime
commerce.”143 As we have seen, the introductory clause of this
formulation has been commandeered as a decisive component in Theriot’s
admiralty contract standard and as the fulcrum supporting Doiron’s two-
step restatement of the standard.
Four points stand out in this reasoning. First, the formula and its 
recapitulation in the scenario’s various linkages premises its maritime tort 
standard on a relationship of functionality of the worker’s effort in
facilitating mineral extraction, rather than of SRTMA’s similarity of the
work so performed with some counterpart in traditional maritime activity.
That is, the tort does not lose its admiralty status if the activity fails the
SRTMA test, so long as the activity facilitates the drilling process, which, 
in turn, Pippen blesses as “maritime commerce.”
Pippen illustrates the point in distinguishing its scenario from a same-
year Fifth Circuit decision, Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal 
States Gas Producing Co.,144 which denied SRTMA status for allegedly
wrongful activity that, recalling B1 Bundle, resulted in an action for 
property damages arising from the blowout of a gas well, the wireline 
services for which were being conducted from a vessel.145 Observing
Sohyde’s portrayal of these services as “hardly of a peculiarly maritime 
142. Pippen, 661 F.2d 378.
143. Id. at 384.
144. 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981). 
145. Unlike the BP MDL scenario, OCSLA played no role in the Sohyde 
blowout, which occurred in Louisiana waters.
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374 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
nature,”146 Pippen continued, “[l]ikewise, we do not conclude that
Pippen’s function or role was of a peculiarly maritime nature. Indeed, his
job could have been performed either offshore or on land.”147 What counts
is the “purpose of the work, not solely … the particular skills used.”148 
Second, Pippen’s unit of analysis is not SRTMA’s granular “wrongful 
activity,” but an aggregation of multiple elements gathered together under
the mantle of “maritime commerce.” Third, Pippen essentially assumes 
that oil and gas operations constitute “maritime commerce,” largely—if
not exclusively—because a vessel’s substantial utilization is an 
inextricable feature of master contracts, which typically provide both for
indemnification and for the services of the contractor or subcontractor
whose employee is injured in the underlying tort.149 That assumption fared 
very poorly indeed in Herb’s Welding, which, as shortly detailed,
effectively dismissed it out of hand before unqualifiedly declaring that the
“exploration and development of the Continental Shelf are not themselves
maritime commerce.”150 
But SRTMA goes the other way. It segregates the element of the 
vessel’s location on navigable waters—as well as Pippen’s various other 
elements—from the oil and gas activity being conducted on the vessel,
focusing solely on the latter’s degree of whether the dispute is
“substantially salty,”151 hence qualifying for admiralty tort status.
Finally, because Pippen features an activity occurring on or under
state waters, its transfer as a rationale for distinguishing admiralty from 
non-admiralty contracts may enjoy more latitude than one formulated for 
the OCS activities that put in play the constraints earlier considered in the
OCSLA and SRTMA discussion.152 One might expect that Theriot and
146. Pippen, 661 F.2d at 384 n.10 (quoting Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v.
Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 382 (quoting Trotti & Thompson v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214, 1221 
n.16 (5th Cir. 1980)).
149. The link between an underlying tort and the related indemnification contract
was decoupled with respect to determining whether the contract is in admiralty by 
Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009).
150. Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 425 (1985).
151. The phrase is that of Justice John Brown in Sohyde Drilling & Marine
Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981). 
152. In addressing the variables that may influence the admiralty versus non-
admiralty contract question, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Lewis v. Glendel
Drilling, 898 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1990), acknowledges that “[b]y act of Congress,
whether the contract covered activity in state territorial waters or on the Outer
Continental Shelf will also have an impact on the choice of law,” citing, inter alia,
Laredo Offshore Constructors Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1985), 
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3752020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
Doiron would likely be similarly restricted, but, as we have seen,
discipline in selecting and applying jurisdictional and choice of law tests
cannot be assumed in Fifth Circuit oil and gas jurisprudence.153 
Four years after Pippen, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth 
Circuit’s endorsement of the Pippen test in Herb’s Welding, severely
undermining and effectively overruling the standing of the Pippen test as
the measure of a maritime tort.154 The Court, one might surmise from the 
following paragraphs, signaled its readiness to endorse a more vigorous
reading of OCSLA’s legislative history than the Rodrigue’s two 
dimensions permit.
Gray, who was injured while welding a gas flow line on a Louisiana
fixed platform, successfully appealed to a Department of Labor Benefit
Review Board an administrative law judge’s ruling that cited Rodrigue in
holding that Gray’s work lacked the connection with “maritime
employment” demanded by the LHWCA § 902(3) because it “totally”
involved oil production from submerged lands.155 The Board reversed on
the alternative ground provided by OCSLA § 1333(b), which grants 
LHWCA benefits to offshore workers injured on the OCS, occasioning the 
appeal of Herb’s Welding’s to the Fifth Circuit. 
The Fifth Circuit declined to consider “whether [OCSLA] applies to 
this case,”156 instead turning to the LHWCA’s “maritime employment”
status requirement. The court neutralized Rodrigue’s identification of a
fixed platform as an island by observing that “[m]aritime employment
turns not on geography but on the maritime nature of the work,” adding 
that “the purpose of the work is the central inquiry, not the particular skills
used by the worker.”157 
It then ruled in Gray’s favor in an analysis that duplicated—and
cited—Pippen. Its test, therefore, was “whether Gray’s work had a 
realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime activity
which denied a contract admiralty status because it concerned construction of a
fixed platform on the OCS. 
153. In Mays v. C-Drive LLC, No. 16-13139, 2018 WL 3642005 (E.D. La.
Aug. 1, 2018), the Fifth Circuit’s eastern federal district court of Louisiana held
that an indemnification contract is in admiralty under the Doiron two-step test in
a third-party indemnification action arising in consequence of an injury suffered
by a pipeline worker injured while working on an OCS pipeline. The opinion is
silent on the question posed in text.
154. Herb’s Welding v. Gray, 703 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1983).
155. Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 417 (1985).
156. Herb’s Welding, 703 F.2d at 178 (characterizing the platform worker as
located “in territorial waters”).
157. Id. at 179.
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  98 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
  
   
 
 
     
  
 
 
  
   
 
  
      
    
   
  
 
 
    
    
    
    
 
 
    
   
 
 
      
 
    
    
    
  
    
    
    
376 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
involving navigation and commerce on navigable waters.”158 The Fifth
Circuit cited a finding that Gray’s work is vital to gas and oil drilling,
which, in turn, it deemed as “maritime commerce,” hence qualifying 
Gray’s status as one of “maritime employment.”159 
The Supreme Court also accepted the issue ofwhether Gray’s welding 
work constituted maritime employment under the LHWCA § 902(3), but 
only as its point of departure. The Court located Gray’s work on the Bay 
Marchand oil and gas field, whose drilling platforms were partly within
Louisiana waters and partly on the OCS. The Court viewed this co-
location arrangement as bringing both OCSLA and the LHWCA into play.
The Court made clear that with OCSLA came its legislative history and 
Rodrigue’s evaluation of that history, neither of which flatter the concept 
of admiralty law’s governance of OCS fixed platform oil and gas
operations.
The Court then turned to the Fifth Circuit’s rationale that “Gray’s
work bore ‘a realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime
activity involving navigation and commerce on navigable waters’ . . . 
because it was an integral part of the offshore drilling process, which the 
court held in Pippen v. Shell Oil Co. . . .was itself maritime commerce.”160 
The Supreme Court was not kind to this rationale, which, in its view, 
contributed to the “Fifth Circuit’s expansive view of maritime 
employment.”161 It described as “untenabl[y]” over-inclusive the claim
that “offshore drilling is maritime commerce and that anyone performing
any task that is part and parcel of this activity is in maritime employment” 
because “this approach would extend coverage to virtually everyone on
the stationary platform.”162 As if that were not enough, the Court added
that “[t]he history of the Lands Act at the very least forecloses the Court
of Appeals’ holding that offshore drilling is a maritime activity and that 
any task essential thereto is maritime employment for LHWCA
purposes.”163 
The Court likewise made clear that it did not limit its evaluation to the
LHWCA’s use of the term “maritime,” and the analysis extended to the
term’s generic use over the entire field of OCS oil and gas operations. The 
Court stated, “We cannot assume that Congress was unfamiliar with
Rodrigue and the Lands Act [OCSLA] when it referred to ‘maritime
158. Id.
159. Id. at 179–80.
160. Herb’s Welding, Inc., 470 U.S. at 418–19 (quoting Herb’s Welding v.
Gray, 703 F.2d 176, 179–80 (5th Cir. 1983)).
161. Id. at 423.
162. Id. at 421. 
163. Id. at 422. 
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3772020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
employment’ in defining the term ‘employee’ [in its 1972 addition of
§ 902(3) to the LHWCA].”164 
The Court went further still in a passage that doubles as an exposition
of a non-SRTMA activity:
Gray’s welding work was far removed from traditional LHWCA
activities . . . . He built and maintained pipelines and the platforms
themselves. There is nothing inherently maritime about those 
tasks. They are also performed on land, and their nature is not 
significantly altered by the marine environment . . . .165 
Potentially the most unsettling of Herb Welding’s declarations as they
relate to the later decisions of Theriot and Doiron is Herb Welding’s
unqualified assertion that “exploration and development of the Continental
Shelf are not themselves maritime commerce.”166 This question, as noted 
earlier, is largely beyond the scope of this Article, but it richly deserves
attention and possible harmonization in an admiralty contracts
environment.
C. The Theriot/Doiron Standard 
David W. Robertson, an astute commentator on this jurisprudence, 
authored a 2007 article provocatively subtitled Correcting the Fifth 
Circuit’s Mistakes,167 which labeled the Circuit’s “copious jurisprudence
on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . an infamously chaotic area
of the law.” One source of the chaos singled out was the “inherent 
weaknesses of the constraints on panels’ treatments of one another’s
work—in combination with the court’s reluctance to conduct en banc 
hearings.”168 Similarly candid expressions of the Circuit’s own frustration
appear in other Fifth Circuit panel decisions.169 
164. Id. at 422–23.
165. Id. at 425.
166. Id.
167. Robertson, supra note 2, at 489.
168. Id. at 489.
169. See, e.g., Hoda v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 419 F.3d 379, 380 (5th Cir.
2005) (noting that the court’s OCSLA jurisprudence “creates uncertainty, spawns 
litigation, and hinders the rational calculation of costs and risks”); Smith v. Penrod 
Drilling Co., 960 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 1992) (“our case law arguably conflicts
with OCSLA”) (overruled on other grounds); Grand Island Shipyard, Inc. v.
Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2010); Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co.,
898 F.2d 1083, 1084 (“uncertain policy underpinning our result”), 1087
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378 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Doiron, the long-awaited en banc opinion,170 shows evidence of being 
designed to offer deliverance from the chaos in its effort to provide a 
relatively clear, simple, and administrable admiralty contract standard 
rooted in one legal claim and two factual requirements. The legal rule, 
which, as we have seen, comes to Doiron from Theriot by way of Pippen
is as follows: “Oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is
recognized to be maritime commerce.”171 
The first of the two factual inquiries, which is also vintage Pippen, 
asks whether the contract “provide[s] services to facilitate the drilling or 
production of oil and gas on navigable waters.” Recall Pippen’s linkages:
as an integral part of the offshore drilling process, the work triggering the 
litigation is necessary “to facilitate” that process, which itself is “maritime 
commerce.”172 This rationale, which neither asks nor cares whether the
work is “inherently maritime,”173 ought to be less difficult to administer 
than the Davis & Sons’s multi-factor test, given the Circuit’s seven 
decades of cataloging facilitative activities since OCSLA’s passage in
1953.174 
The second inquiry, which asks whether the contract provides or the 
parties expect that a vessel will play a substantial role in the contract’s
performance, looks to Theriot175 and its progeny for their indexes of 
(“inconsistent lines of authority”) (“case radiates with the uncertainties that exist 
in this area of the law”). 
170. The pathway to Doiron was illuminated somewhat by the court’s earlier
decision in Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (en banc). See infra text accompanying notes 223–24.
171. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538–39 (5th Cir. 1986)
(paraphrasing somewhat the statement in Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378, 
384 (5th Cir. 1978) that “[s]ince offshore drilling—the discovery, recovery, and 
sale of oil and natural gas from the sea bottom—is maritime commerce, it follows 
that the purpose of Pippen’s work was to facilitate maritime commerce”). Aside 
from the criticism of this view in Herb’s Welding, commentators have portrayed 
the issue as severe overreaching by the judiciary on a matter properly left to 
Congress. See Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034, 1054 (5th
Cir. 1982) (Gee, J., dissenting). 
172. Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 1981).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 144–47.
174. In In re Crescent Energy Services L.L.C., 896 F.3d 350, 360–61 (5th Cir.
2018), the court cited multiple factors as confirming the substantiality under
Doiron step two of the use of a vessel, including its utility both as a work platform
and for storage of equipment, including a crane, as well as the conduct from the
vessel of a wireline project, “the most important component of the work.” 
175. Theriot quotes Benedict that “[i]n order that . . . [maritime] character
should attach, there must be a direct and proximate juridical link between the 
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3792020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
“substantiality” factors. Although some variance in post-Doiron treatment
of this topic is inevitable, it too should fall well short of the pre-Doiron
period’s “infamously chaotic” range of judicial efforts to distinguish
admiralty from non-admiralty contracts. 
Several of Doiron’s dimensions merit comment in relation to this
Article’s thesis that B1 Bundle’s exclusive reliance on Theriot to support
its position that the BP blowout “bore a substantial relationship” is 
demonstrably misconceived. Moreover, Part II of this Article explains
why Wildlife’s addition of Grubart to B1 Bundle’s citation of Theriot is 
likewise off-target.
Most directly in contention is that Grubart’s SRTMA admiralty tort 
standard differs by rationale and goal from the Theriot/Doiron admiralty 
contract standard. The tests’ respective uses of the key term “relationship” 
reflects a different rationale associated with different goals.
The SRTMA test founds its concept of the relationship between the 
tortious activity and traditional maritime activity on resemblance or
similarity in support of the goal, as stated initially in Executive Jet, of
insuring that the “reasons for applying special admiralty rules would apply 
in the suit at hand.”176 Stated conversely, the tortious activity must not be
so remote from “traditional maritime activity,” the emblem of admiralty
law’s wisdom, as to disqualify the latter’s selection to govern the dispute 
occasioned by the activity.
The Theriot/Doiron test’s goal, as derived from Pippen, however, is
to insure that the regulated activity enjoys a realistically significant 
relationship to traditional maritime activity involving navigation and
commerce on navigable waters. This goal is achieved, Pippen holds, when
the activity being assessed facilitates an intermediate activity that, in turn,
qualifies as “maritime commerce.” Facilitation, therefore, is the concept
upon which the relationship is premised. Pippen’s firm imprint is evident
in Doiron’s step one, which requires as the intermediate step that the 
contract provide “services to facilitate the drilling or production of oil and
gas on navigable waters.”177 As to the latter’s link to “maritime
commerce,” Doiron, following Theriot and Pippen, leaves no doubt, at 
least for those not troubled by the Supreme Court’s hostility to Doiron’s 
contract and the operation of a ship.” 1 ERASTUS C. BENEDICT, BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY § 183 (7th ed. 1985). Also, the Theriot court observed that the
contract before it “did not merely touch incidentally on a vessel, but directly 
addressed the use and operation of the Drilling Barge Rome.” Theriot v. Bay 
Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 1986). 
176. See supra text accompanying note 103.
177. In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2018). 
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380 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
proposition: “Oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is
recognized to be maritime commerce.”178 
An independent basis for the respective tests’ difference is that 
Theriot/Doiron not only omit SRTMA’s resemblance criterion but
aggressively dismisses its relevance altogether. Theriot/Doiron focus
generically on the injured employee’s work to determine if it aligns with— 
or facilitates—the vessel’s mission, which, as integral to maritime
commerce, is itself inherently maritime. Thus, a doctor’s work aboard a
hospital vessel facilitates the vessel’s mission, even though her medical
skills are not peculiarly maritime taken by themselves. A major reason
why Doiron rejects Davis & Sons’s six-factor test is that its second 
prong—“what did the crew actually do?”—requires “the panel to parse the
precise facts related to services performed under the contract and
determine whether those services are inherently maritime.” Doiron holds, 
however, that parsing the facts is not only time-consuming and imprecise,
but also unnecessary because “[t]he fact is, none of these services are
inherently maritime.”179 
Taken at its word, this statement is as profoundly significant for
SRTMA tort analysis as it is mundane for Theriot/Doiron contract
analysis. It concedes that a non-SRTMA outcome is appropriate for any 
allegedly wrongful activity arising from the provision of oil and gas 
services from a vessel in navigable waters. Doiron’s effort to secure 
greater clarity in the administration of admiralty contract disputes 
promises, perhaps unwittingly, increased certainty and efficiency in the
SRTMA standard’s administration in tort disputes. 
The respective standards differ in two further respects. The admiralty 
standard focuses on a complex set of linkages connecting the injured
employee’s work ultimately to marine oil and gas drilling as “maritime
commerce.” SRTMA explores, typically in a more granular fashion,180 
whether the specific tortious activity is sufficiently similar to traditional 
maritime activity to ensure that the “reasons for applying special admiralty
rules would apply in the suit at hand.”181 
The second concern differentiates the tests on broader policy grounds 
intrinsic to the division between tort and contract generally. Doiron notes
that its admiralty contract test “places the focus on the contract and the
expectations of the parties . . . [thereby] assist[ing] the parties in evaluating 
178. Id. at 575 (quoting Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538–39 
(5th Cir. 1986)).
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying note 114.
181. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 539–40 (1995).
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3812020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
their risks, particularly their liability under indemnification clauses in the 
contract.”182 It compares the similarity of this analysis to its prior en banc
opinion in Grand Isle Shipyard Co. v. Seacor Marine, LLC,183 which 
approved the “focus of the contract” criterion over the situs of the injury 
as the determinative variable for evaluating oil and gas contractual 
indemnity agreements. “Applying tort rules,” Grand Isle noted, “allow[s] 
the fortuitous location of an accident to determine the situs—and the
applicable law—of a contractual controversy.”184 
II. THE MACONDOWELL’S PRODUCTION CASING AND TEMPORARY 
ABANDONMENT ACTIVITY: AN “INHERENTLY NON-MARITIME”/NON-
SRTMAOCS OIL AND GAS OPERATION SERVICE 
Part I undertook to disentangle the standards associated with the 
SRTMA tort, Pippen’s “maritime employment,” and Theriot/Doiron’s 
admiralty contract to clear the way to evaluate whether B1 Bundle
improperly conferred SRTMA status on the BP blowout. The Part clarifies
that, in its reliance on Theriot, a leading Fifth Circuit contract standards 
opinion, B1 Bundle chose the wrong champion for the former’s SRTMA
tort determination. Wildlife’s muddled mixing of admiralty contract and
torts standards doesn’t sustain the SRTMA case either. A “strong 
argument,” it asserts, yet notably fails to present, “exists for the 
proposition,” first, that the blowout occurred “while the vessel was
engaged in the maritime activity of conducting offshore drilling 
operations,” and, second, that the “disaster had a significant effect on
maritime commerce.”185 It cites Theriot, presumably for the first
observation, and Grubart, presumably for the second. Again, Theriot fails
as an out-of-place contract standard while Grubart is in the right church
but the wrong pew. Grubart does indeed formulate a mature SRTMA
standard, but Grubart’s Chicago River and construction barge scenario, 
which neatly aligns with the standard, differs fundamentally from the BP 
OCS blowout scenario, which does not.186 
Comparatively, Doiron chose the wrong church and the wrong pew.
It selectedWildlife to demonstrate that “maritime law applied in reference
to the oil spill that ‘occurred while the vessel[, Deepwater Horizon,] was 
182. In re Larry Doiron, 879 F.3d at 576.
183. 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2010).
184. Id. at 787.
185. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2014). 
186. The fundamental differences between the two scenarios appear in this
Article’s detailed account of the BP MDL/LLA trial’s conclusions of fact and law
discussed in Section II.B, infra.
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382 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
engaged in the maritime activity of conducting offshore drilling 
operations.’”187 This language is a segment hewn from the admiralty
contract standard reviewed in Part I and endorsed by Doiron itself. It 
clearly fails, moreover, to square with the tort standard associated both
with Wildlife’s citation and with Wildlife’s paraphrase of Grubart that 
Wildlife included to align itself with B1 Bundle and the BP OCS tort 
scenario.
A. SRTMA/“Inherently Non-Maritime” Activity in the Fifth Circuit
The improperly conducted Macondo well production casing and
temporary abandonment activity is not SRTMA-compliant because it is
“inherently non-maritime” under the confluence of the OCSLA/SRTMA 
analytic pathways detailed. Grounded in well-established Fifth Circuit oil 
and gas jurisprudence, this subsection commences by dividing the latter
into representative opinions reflecting what I have termed either a “solo
tort” or a “dual Rodrigue/Grubart-action.” I contrast both categories of 
opinions with a third set of opinions that feature a combined underlying 
tort/third-party indemnification action, titled here a “tort/indemnification
action.”
The solo tort group, which Sohyde Drilling Co. v. Coastal States Gas
Producing Co. illustrates,188 manifests the OCSLA/SRTMA pattern’s
power to secure non-admiralty law’s governance over tortiously
conducted marine oil and gas operations that are deemed “inherently non-
maritime” and hence are remote from Grubart’s connection to a 
“traditional maritime activity.”189 Two opinions represent the dual
Rodrigue/Grubart action: Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. v. 
AmClyde Engineered Products Co. (AmClyde)190 and Hufnagel v. Omega
Service Industries (Hufnagel),191 so labeled because they overlay
Rodrigue’s and Grubart’s confluent reasoning in concluding that
admiralty law does not apply of its own force to tortious activities on
stationary platforms under PLT step two in either case.
The tort/indemnification action reviews two opinions, Thurmond v.
Delta Well Surveyors (Thurmond)192 and Hoda v. Rowan Companies, Inc.
187. In re Larry Doiron, 879 F.3d at 575 (quoting In re Deepwater Horizon,
745 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2014)).
188. 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981). 
189. See Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 425 (1985). 
190. 448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2006).
191. 182 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999).
192. 836 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1988).
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3832020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
(Hoda),193 which illustrate the pre-Doiron basis upon which the Circuit 
divides admiralty from non-admiralty contracts relating to oil and gas 
development operations. Thurmond denies, but Hoda affirms, admiralty
contract status for the indemnification clauses at issue. 
1. Sole Tort Action
Decided 1981—the same year as Pippen—Sohyde Drilling Co. v.
Coastal States Gas Producing Co.194 merits scrutiny as a solo tort decision
assessing an oil and gas well blowout that resulted from an improperly 
conducted workover operation conducted by Sohyde on a 
semisubmersible vessel on Louisiana waters. Sohyde concluded that the 
blowout failed to satisfy the admiralty tort jurisdiction’s SRTMA
principle, which, unlike OCSLA § 1333(a), reaches activities in both state 
and OCS waters. The decision affords valuable guidance for assessing the
BP blowout’s failure, as well as other tortious oil and gas happenings in 
both locations.
Sohyde, like B1 Bundle,195 addressed the Admiralty Extension Act,196 
which extended admiralty jurisdiction to damages suffered on land that are 
caused by a vessel in navigable waters. In light of the Act’s legislative
history, Sohyde refused to exempt the blowout from the demands of the 
SRTMA principle.197 Applying Executive Jet in conjunction with an
earlier Fifth Circuit decision,198 Sohyde addressed the roles of the parties,
the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved, and the event’s 
causation and type of injury. It deemed the parties’ roles as workover 
contractor and well operator to be “hardly of a peculiarly maritime
nature.”199 Leaving open whether the semi-submersible was a “vessel” for
purposes of this action,200 the court also reasoned that the tortious
activity—the improperly conducted workover—lacked a “peculiarly salty 
flavor.”201 
193. 419 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2005). 
194. 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1982).
195. B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 951 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d sub nom., In
re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014).
196. 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2018).
197. Sohyde Drilling Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132,
1134–35 (5th Cir. 1982).
198. Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973). 
199. Sohyde, 644 F.2d at 1137.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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384 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Also counting against SRTMA conformance were both the status of
the “instrumentalities” involved as “essentially the same as those involved 
in a land-based workover operation”202 and the status of the failed 
workover operation as a causative factor that “could just as easily have 
occurred on land.”203 Finally, the court stressed that the property damages
being sought were “indistinguishable from those arising from land-based
well blowouts.”204 Lest the significance be lost regarding the property 
damages feature, which marks B1 Bundle as well, almost all of this
Article’s tort cases derive from the same non-property damages scenario
it equates with the “Fifth Circuit model”—namely, a scenario narrowly 
centered upon the death or injury on a platform or vessel of one or several 
workers engaged in marine oil and gas operations.205 
2. Dual-Status Fixed Platform Action
Part I observed that Grubart’s SRTMA neatly interfaces with the 
pathway created by OCSLA, Rodrigue, and Herb’s Welding.206 In some 
instances and on its own account, however, Grubart’s SRTMA duplicates
or supplements outcomes available under this pathway. For example, the 
SRTMA principle affords an alternative basis to OCSLA and Rodrigue’s 
“artificial islands” rationale for denying admiralty law’s governance of
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1138.
205. In a second property damages case, Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v.
American International Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit
sharply distinguished property damages suits from the Fifth Circuit oil and gas
personal injury and death paradigm, which focuses on “the general maritime law 
remedies for a vessel’s unseaworthiness, the protections of maintenance and cure,
and the statutory rights provided by the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, [which] 
extend to certain oil field employees working on special-purpose watercraft in the
exploration for oil and gas lying beneath navigable waters.” Id. at 1052. The 
Houston Oil panel felt “constrained to apply non-maritime principles in
consequence of our holding in [Sohyde],” id. at 1053, even though doing so 
“requires the application of potentially inconsistent rules of law to different claims
arising from a single incident,” which “invites the spectre of unwanted confusion
with a potential for unjust results and a loss of the uniformity admiralty law seeks 
to provide.” Id. at 1054. The Circuit’s evident discomfort with a property damages
scenario found in Sohyde or B1 Bundle, in contrast with its comfort with a model
premised on the personal injury and death of one or several workers on a drilling 
vessel or platform, is revisited in Section II.B.
206. See supra Section I.A.
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3852020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
injuries incurred by workers on fixed platforms.207 Separate and apart from
the injuries’ location on an OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A) fixed platform situs
may be the inherently non-maritime character of the activity that the 
worker was performing when injured. Consideration of dual-basis
decisions affords a novel angle from which to observe the confluence of
the two pathways respecting inherently non-maritime activities. 
Two of various relevant Fifth Circuit OCS oil and gas opinions208 
serve to illustrate the dual basis concept: Texaco Exploration and 
Production, Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered Products Co. (AmClyde)209 and 
Hufnagel v. Omega Service Industries (Hufnagel).210 Both arose from
activities conducted on a fixed platform under OCSLA §§ 1333(a)(1) and
1333(a)(2)(A),211 and each avoids blockage by admiralty law’s application
207. The dual basis blocking admiralty law’s application to fixed platform
injuries is often overlooked by reasoning that attributes this result solely to the
location of the injury on a fixed platform in light of the Supreme Court’s reference 
to the distinction offered by lower courts between injuries suffered on vessels and 
those on fixed platforms. SeeHerb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 416 n.2
(1985); Robertson, supra note 90. But the illustrative dual-basis cases in text, and
certainly Herb’s Welding itself, are as attentive to the inherently non-maritime
nature of the activity occurring on their respective fixed platforms as they are to
the simple presence of the latter.
208. See, e.g., Fornah v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 737 Fed. Appx. 677, 680– 
82 (5th Cir. 2018); Hicks v. BP Expl’n & Prod’n Inc., 308 F. Supp. 3d 878 (E.D.
La. 1986); cf. Stiltner v. Exxon Corp., 593 F. Supp. 18, 19 (E.D. La. 2018). 
209. 448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2006).
210. 182 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999).
211. The BP blowout event also satisfies the PLT step one situs requirement,
but it does so through a different route tied to the Deepwater Horizon’s status 
under OCSLA § 1333(a)(1) as a “device . . . temporarily attached to the seabed.” 
B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 944–53 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d sub nom., In re
Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014). My focus in reviewing the two 
cases in text, however, is on PLT step two to illustrate that admiralty law fails to
apply of its own force either because the tortious activity is not SRTMA-qualified, 
or because OCSLA § 1333(a)(1) or § 1333(a)(2)(A)—or both—choice of law
rules preclude admiralty law’s selection. Properly, AmClyde highlights the 
presence of fixed platforms as an important factor in justifying the choice of non-
admiralty law under its specific facts. But the inclusion in B1 Bundle’s scenario 
of the Deepwater Horizon vessel as an OCSLA § 1333(a)(1) “device . . .
temporarily attached to the seabed” also satisfies PLT step one, as evidenced by
the inclusion of such devices in this step by Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 
F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds, Grand Isle Shipyard, 
Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2009), the determinative Fifth
Circuit opinion on this matter.
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386 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
of its own force under PLT step two in light of their respective dual status
under the OCSLA, Rodrigue, and Grubart rationales. 
AmClyde addressed the property claims arising from the completion 
of an OCS fixed drilling tower when the main load line of a barge-mounted 
crane failed, causing a deck section suspended from the crane to fall into
the Gulf. As the successor to the crane’s designer, AmClyde was among
the parties Texaco sued for the total loss of the module and damages
related to reconstruction. The panel sustained Texaco’s claims, which it 
concluded, while closely connected to the OCS’s development, were not 
sufficiently linked to traditional maritime activity to satisfy Grubart’s 
SRTMA standard.212 
The court then turned to Rodrigue and Herb’s Welding. It quoted
Rodrigue’s declaration that “‘drilling platforms [are] not even suggestive 
of traditional maritime affairs.’”213 Additionally, the court neither found
inherently maritime activity nor identified OCS oil and gas development 
with maritime commerce.214 AmClyde, like Sohyde before it, also viewed
Texaco’s claims for property damages as a marker of the non-admiralty 
nature of these claims because they “are not the stuff of traditional 
maritime activity on the high seas.”215 AmClyde also acknowledges the
barge crane’s role in the equation, but it is careful to instruct that a good 
deal more than vessel presence alone is required to “support either
admiralty jurisdiction or the application of substantive maritime law.”216 
Hufnagel is a sole tort case in which Hufnagel, an employee of an oil
platform services company, sued his employer and a platform owner in
state court following an injury he sustained while working as a rigger on 
an OCS stationary platform. Upon removal of the lawsuit to a federal 
district court, the claimant petitioned for remand, which the federal court
212. Texaco Expl. & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 
760, 771 (5th Cir. 2006).
213. Id. at 774 (quoting Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 
(1969)). 
214. Id. at 774–75.
215. Id at 774.
216. Id. at 775. AmClyde’s service as a precedent is evident in Petrobras 
America, Inc. v. Vicinay Cadenas, S.A., 815 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2016), the facts of 
which roughly track those in AmClyde insofar as Petrobras addressed whether 
Grubart’s SRTMA requirement was satisfied in an event in which a component 
failed in an underwater structure during an offshore production installation, which 
caused the structure to fall to the sea floor. Petrobras cited AmClyde’s holding 
that its own tort claims are “inextricably connected with the development of the
Outer Continental Shelf and an installation for the production of resources there.”
Id. at 218. “[A]s AmClyde confirms,” it added, “development on the Outer
Continental Shelf is not a traditional maritime activity.” Id.
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3872020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
denied on the basis that his OCSLA claim supported removal jurisdiction.
Because OCSLA does not displace admiralty law, however, substantive
maritime law continues to govern if both OCSLA and admiralty 
jurisdiction apply. The court resolved the choice in favor of OCSLA-
determined adjacent state law when, in its PLT step two ruling, it
concluded that because admiralty tort jurisdiction law was nullified under
Hufnagel’s facts, it did not apply “on its own force.”
The Fifth Circuit agreed, expressly basing the conclusion that
Hufnagel’s claim was not maritime upon both the OCSLA/Rodrigue and
the SRTMA rationales. As to the former, it cited Rodrigue’s insistence that
the platform was not “within admiralty jurisdiction” and was viewed as an
artificial island.217 Nor was “Grubart’s connection test”218 satisfied 
because the activity giving rise to Hufnagel’s accident—the repair of a
fixed platform—lacked a significant relation to navigation. In the court’s
view, the activity’s sole focus was the pursuit of minerals from the shelf.219 
3. The Tort/Indemnification Action
Neither the decades-long chaos preceding Doiron in the tort– 
indemnification contract sphere, nor the Fifth Circuit’s determined effort
to end this chaos upends the foregoing non-SRTMA portrayal of tortious
oil and gas development service activities. On the contrary, Doiron
categorically acknowledges that “none of these services are inherently 
maritime.”220 None, therefore, will be SRTMA-qualified.
A defensible generalization of the Fifth Circuit’s approach to these
pre-Doiron tort–contract opinions is two-fold. Scenarios involving third-
party indemnification contract actions that are set in motion by an 
underlying tort and that expressly or implicitly engage the conduct of oil
and gas operations from a vessel in navigable water under the mantle of
“maritime commerce” warrant admiralty contract governance. Those that 
arise from an underlying tortious service activity that is not “inextricably
intertwined” with the foregoing assemblage and, in consequence, fail to 
217. Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 351–52 (5th Cir. 
1999).
218. Id. at 352.
219. Id. For other Fifth Circuit opinions drawing on both OCSLA/Rodrigue
and the SRTMA principle to deny admiralty governance of events occurring on 
fixed platforms, see Fornah v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 737 Fed. Appx. 677,
680–82 (5th Cir. 2018); Hicks v. BP Expl’n & Prod’n Inc., 308 F. Supp. 3d 878, 
890–91 (E.D. La. 2018); cf. Stiltner v. Exxon Corp., 593 F. Supp. 18, 19 (E.D. La. 
1983). 
220. In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
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388 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
bear sufficient resemblance to a traditional maritime counterpart face non-
admiralty contract management.221 
This generalization eliminates the need to become entangled in the 
“famously chaotic” contract opinions that the Fifth Circuit itself has
recognized as random, inconsistent, and unprincipled.222 This Article
limits itself to the selection of two opinions from the pre-Doiron era, 
Thurmond and Hoda, as tort/indemnification action twin paradigms—the 
first featuring a non-admiralty and the second an admiralty contract 
outcome. The second also illustrates the debt its rationale owes to Pippen
and Theriot, as well as why the reciprocal of Doiron’s ultimate admiralty
contract paradigm is Doiron’s wholesale labeling of tortious oil and gas
servicing activities as inherently non-maritime.
These observations have undergone modification in light of the
admiralty law standard changes called for in the Circuit’s 2009 Grand Isle
decision and, of course, in the 2018 Doiron decision. Grand Isle is best 
understood as Doiron’s herald because it decoupled the indemnification 
contract from the underlying tort, thus converting what had earlier been a 
joint consideration of the tort and contract into a pure contract evaluation.
In the former instance, the court’s choice of non-admiralty law for the tort 
as non-SRTMA, for example, might produce a similar result for the 
contract when the event’s situs for PLT step one is a stationary platform,
or it might create the converse result if a vessel is deemed the situs.223 
Grand Isle does not necessarily preclude either outcome; however, it
premises its determination not on situs, but on a focus-of-the-contract
standard, which may or may not call for a different result than the prior
tort situs-based evaluation.224 
221. As noted below, infra text accompanying notes 223–24, the
generalization does not accurately describe post-Doiron Fifth Circuit admiralty 
contract jurisprudence.
222. See Kenneth Engerrand, Primer of Remedies on the Outer Continental 
Shelf, 4 LOY. MAR. L.J. 19, 33–66 (2006), as updated in Kenneth Engerrand, 
Reconsideration of Maritime Oilfield Contract Jurisdiction, 1, 26–34 
(Seventeenth Annual Judge Alvin B. Rubin Conference on Maritime Personal
Injury Law, April 26, 2019). Engerrand’s comprehensive review of Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence concludes that agreements historically listed as admiralty contracts
are those dealing with drilling and workover casing, catering, repair, and well-site 
supervision, while those classified as non-maritime include wireline work, testing,
and completion operations.
223. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 783–88 
(5th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
224. In Grand Isle, the employee was injured on a vessel, but the court chose
adjacent state (Louisiana) law rather than admiralty law because the contract 
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3892020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
Thurmond, a tort/indemnification action denying admiralty status to
the indemnification clause of a wireline services contract, exhibits the 
usual pattern of a third-party action between an injured worker’s employer 
and a third party who claimed entitlement to indemnification from the 
employer.225 The latter relied on admiralty law, which endorses such 
indemnification agreements, while the former sought a shield under the
Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act,226 which does not. A state waters 
case, Thurmond does not employ the OCSLA/PLT three-step process, but 
admiralty tort jurisdiction and substantive law will nonetheless override 
the Louisiana statute if admiralty law is deemed to “apply of its own
force.”227 
The Fifth Circuit opinion agreed with the employer because the 
contract’s principal obligation was the performance of the nonmaritime
wireline service duties performable both on land-based and offshore
wells.228 As in Rodrigue, Thurmond also cited expert testimony offered
prior to OCSLA’s enactment that “[m]aritime law in the strict sense has
never had to deal with the resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its 
whole tenor is ill adapted for that purpose.”229 
In Hoda v. Rowan Companies, the Fifth Circuit classified as an 
admiralty contract a Master Service Agreement and associated work
orders under which an OCS well owner, Westport, hired a well equipment
and maintenance firm, Greene, to manage the torquing required to install 
called for the majority of the contract’s performance to occur on the fixed 
platform. Id. at 787–89.
225. An additional defendant was the company that provided the barge from
which the wireline services would be conducted. The defendants were linked to
one another and the third-party plaintiff, the well owner, by a “blanket contract.”
Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors, 836 F.2d 952, 953 (5th Cir. 1988).
226. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2780 (2018).
227. But see Domingue v. Ocean Drilling & Expl’n Co., 923 F.2d 393 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (an OCS wireline services tort/indemnification action in which the PLT
three-step test was employed and in which admiralty law was deemed not to apply
of its own force).
228. Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors, 836 F.2d 952, 955 (5th Cir. 1988). 
The court offered the additional reason that the wireline services were to be 
performed by the injured worker while “standing on the small protective wooden
jacket of the wellhead, a fixed platform . . . . The wellhead was an island, a small 
one but an island.” Id. In this respect, Thurmond recalls both AmClyde and 
Hufnagel, which similarly premised their non-admiralty tort outcomes both on the
non-maritime nature of the pertinent activity and on the events’ performance on a
completed (Hufnagel) or partially completed (AmClyde) fixed platform.
229. Id. (quoting Insular Hearings, supra note 126) (internal quotations 
omitted).
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390 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
and change blow-out preventers. It also engaged Rowan Companies to
provide a vessel on which to stow equipment and to carry other laborers 
to engage in preliminary activities supporting Greene’s employees’ 
subsequent torquing tasks. The agreement included an indemnification
clause that required Greene to indemnify Westport and its contractors, 
including Rowan, from claims by Greene’s employees. One of Greene’s
employees, Hoda, sued Rowan after tripping over hoses on the vessel’s
deck in the course of his work. Rowan filed a third-party complaint against 
Greene seeking indemnity that the court granted, approving Rowan’s
position that, as a component of an admiralty contract, the indemnity 
contract was enforceable and hence not nullified by the Louisiana Oilfield
Indemnity Act, as Greene had countered.
Applying the Davis & Sonsmulti-factor test, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
in a pre-Doiron opinion that is notable on two grounds. The basis on which
it deemed the agreement an admiralty contract clearly recognizes that, had 
Hoda’s torquing activity been evaluated in the underlying tort suit, it
would have been deemed nonadmiralty because it was not SRTMA-
qualified. In addition, its Pippen-sourced reasoning converts these 
nonmaritime activities into agents for a contract’s admiralty status on the
basis that they serve as links in an overall effort that, in facilitating the 
mission of the vessel, confirm the latter’s status as maritime commerce.
The first point is encased in Hoda’s unequivocal declaration that 
“[b]eyond doubt, the torquing services Greene’s provided pertain solely to 
oil and gas development and, in and of themselves, have nothing to do with
traditional maritime activity or commerce.”230 The second turns on the
court’s linking the Hoda crew’s torquing services to Davis & Sons’s
“Factor no. 4, the question whether Greene’s work was ‘related to the
mission of the vessel.’”231 The court did so by reasoning that:
[T]he torquing up and torquing down of the blow-out preventer
stacks was but a discrete function in a carefully orchestrated series
of actions conducted by Rowan during the drilling of the well.
Greene’s services were ‘inextricably intertwined’with the activity
on the rig, were dependent on Rowan's placement of the 
equipment on which Greene’s employees worked, and could not
be performed without the rig's direct involvement.232 
230. Hoda v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 419 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added). 
231. Id. at 383 (quoting Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313,
316 (5th Cir. 1990)).
232. Id. at 383.
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3912020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
It closed by paraphrasing Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co.’s observation 
that “torquing up and torquing down blow-out preventers ‘is an integral 
part of drilling, which is the primary purpose of the vessel,’” as “not 
merely descriptive, but [as] deriv[ing] from the functional 
interrelationship of Greene’s work with the rig.”233 
Both Hoda and Doiron evidence that the Pippen-rooted formula 
linking oil and gas development services that “facilitate” a vessel’s
mission to maritime commerce poses no threat to this Article’s non-
SRTMA thesis. Hoda deems torquing blow-out preventers as definitively
non-maritime. Doiron, it will be recalled,234 abandons Davis & Sons’s
concern for examining the relation between a particular dispute’s oil and 
gas operation service with previously adjudicated operations because
“[t]he fact is, none of these services are inherently maritime.”235 If they are
indeed not inherently maritime, as already observed but worth repeating, 
neither are they SRTMA-qualified.
The Hoda panel accurately observed that “[t]his court’s decisions have 
reflected the inherent tensions between the non-maritime nature and
concerns of traditional oil and gas drilling and those of the salty locale in
which such exploration often occurs.”236 The Fifth Circuit’s admirable
concern for protecting the well-being of seamen and platform workovers,
however, has needlessly—perhaps even purposely—distanced Circuit
jurisprudence from according the weight due to oil and gas drilling’s “non-
maritime values,” such as those identified earlier in the contrast between
the Exxon Valdez ocean surface oil spill and the Macondo sub-OCS well 
blowout.237 The well-being of workers above the OCS can and should be
safeguarded, of course, concurrently with honoring the OCSLA/OPA non-
admiralty values engaged by a sub-seabed oil and gas discharge governed
by OPA. With one exception,238 moreover, negligence committed aboard 
the vessel, although central in a maritime negligence action, is of no import 
in an OPA action because OPA § 2702 imposes strict liability on those 
233. Id. (quoting Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 501 (5th Cir. 
2002).
234. See supra text accompanying note 179.
235. In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2018).
236. Hoda v. Rowan Companies, Inc., 419 F.3d 379, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2005).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 118–25.
238. OPA § 2704(c)(1)(A) provides that in the event of a Responsible Party’s 
gross negligence, the lower level of damages chargeable to the latter under the
OPA § 2704(a) limitation of liability regime is increased to an ordinary damages
level. See Costonis, supra note 1, at 542–45.
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392 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
owning or operating whichever source—vessel or well or both—that
discharges the hydrocarbons.239 
Another factor weighing on the “traditional oil and gas” side is the far-
reaching OPA remedial reform statute, as enriched by the elevated pursuit 
of environmental values in the CWA amendments post-1972 and the
comprehensive 1978 revisions of OCSLA 1953.240 Similarly remote from
the Fifth Circuit’s conventional model for adjudicating platform
negligence incidents impacting one or, rarely, several workers is the B1
Bundle scenario itself. B1 Bundle not only features Sohyde’s economic and 
property damages, but, unlike the conventional model’s one or several
vessel- or platform-located workers, it encompasses 110,000 claimants, 
largely land-based and located some tens or even hundreds of miles distant
from the OCS, the Deepwater Horizon, and the Macondo well.241 
Insistence on forcing the B1 Bundle scenario into the ill-fitting Fifth 
Circuit model worsens and, in certain respects, lies at the root of the
standards’ confusion portrayed in this Article’s Introduction, thereby 
affording another illustration of the unfortunate fruit of admiraltycentric 
imprecision.
4. Doiron Redux
In its search for an exit from its “infamously chaotic” jurisprudence, 
the Circuit’s flight to Doiron is somewhat risky because the Supreme
Court is already on record for its opposition to the Circuit’s “expansive
view of maritime employment.”242 Additionally, the Court has exercised
outright hostility toward Pippen, whose reasoning has taken residence in
Doiron’s admiralty contracts setting. A seasoned account of these 
vulnerabilities and an appropriate response to them exceeds the scope of
this Article, which to this point has used both tort and admiralty contract 
cases because both bear on its basic SRTMA inquiry.
Doiron’s new standard, however, poses two conceptual issues of
common interest to both inquiries. The first is Doiron’s premising its two-
step test on its declaration that marine oil and gas operations conducted
239. See OPA § 2702(a), which has been uniformly interpreted to find a
Responsible Party’s fault on strict liability. 
240. See Costonis, supra note 107, at 540–44.
241. Although the Admiralty Extension Act extends admiralty tort jurisdiction 
to damages on land caused by a vessel, Sohyde has ruled that the Act is no less 
subject to the SRTMA principle than activities whose damaging consequences are 
initiated and consummated on vessels. See Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. 
Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d 1132, 1135–36 (5th Cir. 1981). 
242. Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 423 (1985).
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3932020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
from a vessel qualify as “maritime commerce,” a proposition that brings 
into play prior consideration of OCSLA’s legislative history243 as 
considered in Rodrigue, as well as of Pippen, Theriot, andHerb’s Welding. 
Doiron models its admiralty contract analysis on the Supreme Court’s 
2004 decision in Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby (Kirby).244 Kirby
calls to mind Grubart’s recognition on the tort side that mechanical 
application of standard rules does not work for certain cases, which is a 
posture Kirby adopted with respect to a mixed contract that envisaged both 
sea and land carriage of goods.245 In such instances, Grubart calls for the
variant SRTMA evaluation in torts. Kirby advises a similar flight from
conventional principles in contract:
To ascertain whether a contract is a maritime one, we cannot look 
to whether a ship or other vessel was involved in the dispute, as 
we would in a putative maritime tort case. . . . Nor can we simply
look to the place of the contract’s formation or performance.
Instead, the answer “depends upon . . . the nature and character of
the contract,” and the true criterion is whether it has “reference to
maritime service or maritime transactions.”246 
Kirby leaves us with guardrails favorably poised for categorizing an 
agreement as an admiralty contract: Maritime commerce’s protection is
maritime jurisdiction’s source.247 “Vindication” of that priority results
from “focusing [the] inquiry on whether the principal objective of a 
contract is maritime commerce.”248 Further, “so long as a bill of lading 
243. Doiron, along with Pippen and Theriot, involved state waters scenarios.
A plausible interpretation of Doiron might limit its application accordingly.
However, Doiron has been applied to rule that an agreement is an admiralty 
contract in an OCS scenario. The decision did not discuss the issue in text. See
Mays v. C-Drive LLC, No. 16-13139, 2018 WL 3642005 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2018).
244. 543 U.S. 14 (2004).
245. The agreements in question called for the waterborne transportation of
machinery from Sidney, Australia, to Savannah, Georgia, and thence by railroad
to Huntsville, Alabama. The seaborne phase was uneventful, but the train carrying 
the machinery to Huntsville derailed, causing extensive damage.
246. Kirby, 543 U.S. at 23–24 (citations omitted). 
247. Id. at 25 (“We have reiterated that the fundamental interest giving rise to 
maritime jurisdiction is the protection of maritime commerce.”) (quoting Exxon
Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991) (internal quotations
omitted). 
248. Id.
341734-LSU_80-2_Text.indd  116 4/15/20  8:48 AM
   
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
     
  
   
     
  
   
 
 
    
  
  
    
 
    
   
  
 
   
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
      
 
  
 
   
 
 
  
394 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
requires substantial carriage of goods by sea, its purpose is to effectuate
maritime commerce—and thus it is a maritime contract.”249 
Helpful though these prescriptions are, however, they leave unclear
which of two constructions is intended. Is the reasoning that the Kirby
contract is a maritime contract because it concerns the carriage of goods
by vessel at sea? Or is this function determinative of the agreement’s
classification not because of the kind of use intended overall, but because
its fulfillment demands and the parties intend the substantial, indeed 
indispensable, use of a vessel to perform it?250 In either case, fidelity to 
Kirby requires that Doiron respect Kirby’s insistence that the “principal 
objective” of an admiralty contract is itself a maritime activity
conformable with maritime commerce. 
Meeting this challenge may not be an easy task. Neither Pippen nor 
Theriot, both of which preceded Herb’s Welding, undertake to
demonstrate why marine oil and gas operations constitute “maritime
commerce.” Doiron does make an effort of sorts, but only in a footnote
that quotes several sentences from Boudreaux v. American Workover,251 
249. Id. at 27.
250. The same question may be posed of Theriot’s reliance on Pippen’s 
position that marine oil and gas operations conducted from a vessel constitute 
maritime commerce. Theriot emphasizes that “[t]he contract did not merely touch 
incidentally on a vessel, but directly addressed the use and operation of the 
‘Drilling Barge Rome.’” Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 538 (5th
Cir. 1986). Subsequent Fifth Circuit opinions have construed this language to
support an admiralty contract standard focused exclusively or nearly so on the
“substantial use” of a vessel, rather than as also requiring that the character of that 
use—for example, marine drilling for oil and gas—itself be recognized as
“maritime commerce.” See, e.g., Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083,
1086 (5th Cir. 1990) (Theriot’s conclusion “that the contract ‘focused on the use
of a vessel’ . . . inescapably leads to the same conclusion in this case.”); Smith v.
Penrod Drilling Co., 960 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Theriot, the court 
stated that the “‘main piece of equipment to be supplied by [the contractor] was a
vessel,’ [and] we held that ‘[t]he contract thus focused upon the use of a vessel in 
a maritime transaction and is a maritime contract governed by maritime law.’”) 
(citations omitted).
251. In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 575 n.45 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 664 F.2d 463, 468 (5th Cir. 1982)). The
facile identification of marine oil and gas drilling with “maritime commerce” in
Boudreaux’s majority opinion is harshly criticized in the opinion’s dissent in a 
manner that anticipates Herb’s Welding’s later assault on Pippen, the opinion that
the Boudreaux majority deemed “dispositive” for its own proceeding. See 
Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 664 F.2d 463, 469–80 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(Gee, J., dissenting).
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3952020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
which also precedes Herb’s Welding and, unlike B1 Bundle,252 does not 
engage OCSLA. Boudreaux makes no effort, however, to justify its
posture by identifying or confronting the tensions in the binary land/water 
field as this Article has detailed or as Hoda253 and Lewis v. Glendel
Drilling Co.254 forthrightly acknowledge.
At this juncture, it remains to be seen whether, hypothetically 
considered, the Supreme Court would choose to extend its Herb’s Welding
reasoning from tort to contract in recognizing the migration of the Pippen
rationale from tort to contract. If the Court choses to do so, however, it 
might not find the maritime commerce claim any more persuasive 
currently than it did in Herb’s Welding—four years after Pippen—when it 
denied that “exploration and development of the Continental Shelf are not 
themselves maritime commerce.”255 
A second issue concerns Doiron’s final iteration of its standard as
including two steps only: those relating to a contract concerning oil and
gas operations and to the substantiality of the use of a vessel.256 In the body
of the opinion, however, Doiron overrode the Davis & Sons test, which
inquired into the nature of these services, in part because “none of these
services are inherently maritime.”257 How credible is it when an exercise
ostensibly designed to determine whether a contract is in admiralty opts to 
exclude from the inquiry the very elements most likely to establish that it
is not in admiralty?258 If it is correct to read Doiron as failing to lock
252. The BP blowout occurred on the OCS, but Boudreaux’s setting is “inland 
waters.” Boudreaux, 664 F.2d at 469–80.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 228–39.
254. 898 F.2d 1083, 1087–88 (5th Cir. 1990) (observing that “[t]his case
radiates with the uncertainties that exist in this area of the law [that is, 
distinguishing between an admiralty and a non-admiralty contract].”).
Confounding a legal term of art with its use in popular discourse, on the other
hand, Boudreaux labels marine oil and gas drilling as maritime commerce because
it is . . . maritime commerce. Tautological reasoning of this nature invites a
similarly tautological response declaring that, since oil and gas extraction engages
significant terrestrial values—the basis of the entire enterprise, after all, is the
extraction of sub-seabed oil and gas—it is a terrestrial exercise. Such reasoning, 
of course, resolves nothing. In both cases, a cogent predicate independent of the 
conclusion itself needs to be furnished before a SRTMA determination should be
rendered or denied.
255. Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 F.2d 414, 425 (1985).
256. In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 575–76 (5th Cir. 2018).
257. Id. at 573.
258. A post-Doiron admiralty contract case commences with the phrase, “The 
Doiron test requires the court to consider just two questions,” Mays v. C-Drive
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396 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
“maritime commerce” into its test, which Kirby surely requires, while
effectively declaring its standard satisfied by fiat in Doiron step one, 
Doiron’s test may reduce to little more than Theriot’s substantiality of a 
vessel’s connection to a service operation.259 This, of course, is where
things stood before Doiron, despite Doiron’s appeal to Kirby for change.
A counterargument meriting attention is that “maritime commerce”
need not mean the same thing in the legal discourse of both tort and 
contract in light of the different policies and purposes served by the two
systems. Contract law typically merits greater flexibility than tort law
because it seeks to allow private parties freedom to arrange their affairs as
they mutually agree.260 Comparatively, tort law often seeks to vindicate
unyielding public policies originating in the deeper soil of public health, 
safety, and welfare. Moreover, Lewis v. Glendel advises that because oil
industry players “may already have adjusted” prevailing practices to
existing protocols, “[w]e should not lightly ‘straighten out’ the formal
logic of the law where to do so would upset stable commercial 
expectations.”261 
However controversial, Theriot has been a staple of Fifth Circuit
admiralty contract discourse for more than three decades, and for those 
admiraltycentrically inclined, it can loosely be read to cover Doiron’s 
elements of maritime commerce, marine oil and gas operations, and
substantiality of vessel use. For a circuit determined to exit from its
“infamously chaotic” handiwork, moreover, Doiron satisfies Seventh
LLC, No. 16-13139, 2018 WL 3642005 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2018) (emphasis 
added), and completes its analysis on the basis of Doiron Steps one and two.
259. The construction in text is a plausible reading of Mays.
260. See Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3d 778, 787 
(5th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The first clause in text must be qualified when—as in
the instance when an OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A) selects Louisiana law—implicating 
the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act, a private contract’s choice of law clause
opting for admiralty law is invalid. See Matte v. Zapata Offshore Co., 784 F.2d
628, 631 (5th Cir. 1986). 
261. Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1990). 
Grubart itself points somewhat in the same direction on the tort side in its refusal
to add additional requirements to its SRTMA test: 
[E]xisting case law . . . reflects customary practice in seeing jurisdiction
as the norm when the tort originates with a vessel in navigable waters,
and in treating departure from the locality principle as the exception. For 
better or worse, the case law has thus carved out the approximate shape
of admiralty jurisdiction in a way that admiralty lawyers understand 
reasonably well.
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547
(1995).
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3972020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s counsel that in matters of admiralty tort
and contract, “the most important requirement of a jurisdictional rule is 
not that it appeal to common sense but that it be clear.”262 
B. The BP Blowout: A Profile of the Tortious Activity
The tortiously conducted Macondo well’s production casing and
temporary well abandonment activity was an OCS oil and gas service
operation. Doiron categorically recognizes the inherently non-maritime
status of these operations, and the Fifth Circuit’s solo tort, dual basis, and 
tort/indemnification cases illustrate it in various settings. The latter are not 
unseated by Theriot, a contract case, or Grubart, which mandates a 
division between an activity’s location and its character that precludes 
classifying inherently non-maritime drilling services as SRTMA-
compliant.263 
BP’s Limitation of Liability/MDL trial findings,264 as supplemented 
by related MDL rulings, tell a story dominated by a complex sequence of
non-navigational mishaps that occurred in transitioning the Macondo well 
from an exploratory well to a production facility. Its highlights include the
following elements. 
1. OCSLA Choice of Law Provisions: Sections 1333(a)(1) and
1333(a)(2)(A)
The relevant OCSLA choice of law provision is not OCSLA
§ 1333(a)(2)(A), but OCSLA § 1333(a)(1). The latter deems the
Deepwater Horizon as an OCSLA situs that is a “temporarily attached” 
device and selects OPA as the governing norm for damages falling within 
its province by extending to OCS situses “the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.” Section 1333(a)(2)(A) comes into play only when
necessary to fill gaps in federal law,265 a scenario decidedly not present
262. Tagliere v. Harrah’s Illinois Corp., 445 F.3d 1012, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006).
263. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
264. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 
657 (E.D. La. 2014). As explained by the court:
[T]he Phase One trial concerned two cases within this Multidistrict 
Litigation: the Transocean entities’ limitation action . . . and the United 
States’ claims under the Clean Water Act . . . and Oil Pollution Act of
1990. . . . This includes determining if any Defendant engaged in
misconduct in excess of ordinary negligence . . . and defenses between 
and among the several Defendants. 
Id. at 730.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 133 and 134.
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398 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
here. OPA duplicates the general maritime law tort cause of action,266 
which, under the Robins Drydock principle, requires that the claimant’s
own property be damaged.267 
2. OPA: Comprehensive Remedial Statute for Maritime Oil Discharges
In addition to this duplicative federal statutory cause of action, OPA 
creates other damage categories, switches from maritime law negligence
to strict liability, creates its own limitation of liability regime, and removes 
various other maritime law impediments to recovery.268 Stung by the
inadequacies of statutory and general maritime law remedies exposed in
the Exxon Valdez spill in the year preceding OPA, Congress unanimously
moved to introduce these changes within the very next year. These 
considerations, buttressed by Supreme Court jurisprudence establishing 
the priority of federal statutory law over federal common law or general 
maritime law, are central elements of my earlier-stated position that OPA
displaces the general maritime law oil pollution tort.269 
3. B1 Bundle versus the Fifth Circuit Model
The first two observations differentiate B1 Bundle from the Fifth 
Circuit model. The Fifth Circuit model offsets admiralty law against state 
law, a contest that favors the choice of the preemptive admiralty law. B1
Bundle, on the other hand, opposes federal statutory law—OCSLA and
OPA—to admiralty law, a contest that favors the former over admiralty 
law in the event of conflict. Federal statutory law will not be ousted by 
admiralty law because the absence of any gap excludes admiralty law and
jurisdiction from the scenario, leaving OPA or, less likely, Louisiana state 
law270 as the sole alternatives. This reasoning is similar but not identical to 
the reasoning in AmClyde or Thurmond, in which the inherent non-
266. OPA § 2702(b)(2)(B) covers “damages for injuries to, or economic losses 
resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable
by a claimant who owns or leases that property.”
267. See B1 Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 959–63 (E.D. La. 2011), aff’d sub
nom., In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining the
principle’s origin as in Robins Dry Dock & Repair v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927)).
268. See Costonis, supra note 1, at 537–38, Appendix II.
269. See John Costonis, The BP B1 Bundle Ruling: Federal Statutory
Displacement of General Maritime Law, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 13–19 (2013).
270. The Louisiana alternative is a reserve alternative, only in the unlikely 
event that the gapless choice of OPA were deemed inappropriate. Admiralty 
substantive law is inapplicable in either instance because admiralty tort
jurisdiction requires satisfaction of the SRTMA principle.
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3992020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
maritime character of contested oil and gas service operations left no space 
for admiralty law.
4. Maritime Drilling Operations Liability: Economic and Property 
Damages versus Personal Injury and Death Remedies
Economic and property damages are B1 Bundle’s exclusive remedy,
twinning B1 Bundle with Sohyde. The difference between the Fifth 
Circuit’s assessment of these damages and its own model’s personal injury
or death remedy appears in Broughton Offshore Drilling, Inc. v. South 
Central Machine, Inc.,271 which complained that Sohyde “invites the
spectre of unwanted confusion with a potential for unjust results and a loss
of uniformity admiralty law seeks to provide” and complained that 
“[u]nless and until Sohyde is overruled by an en banc court, we are bound 
by it.” 272 The vehemence of this language exposes how distant from its 
conventional model the Circuit considers a property damage action and,
frankly, how resistant it is to dealing with a federal statutory-based action 
other than within that model’s impervious armor. 
CONCLUSION
The following observations conclude this Article’s position that the 
BP Blowout failed as a SRTMA-qualified event by a selection of the most
pertinent of the BP Limitation of Liability/MDL Trial’s own findings.
1. The Most Significant Determination
Without doubt, the most telling of all the findings is also its most 
briefly stated: the trial court’s categorical declaration that “[f]rom
February 2010 until April, 2010, the DEEPWATER HORIZON was engaged
in drilling activities on the Macondo Well.”273 This is the most forceful,
perhaps unwitting, acknowledgment that OCS drilling on and under OCS
lands, rather than navigation or any other inherently maritime activity, was 
the overwhelming purpose, nature, and source of the activity that resulted
in the BP blowout.274 No more really need be said in defense of denying
271. 911 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1990).
272. Id. at 1054.
273. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 844 F. Supp. 2d 746, 
747–48 (E.D. La. 2012) (emphasis added).
274. Cf. United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647 (2015). The Fifth Circuit
rebuffed on “failure to charge an offense” grounds a criminal procedure against 
two BP well site leaders for involuntary manslaughter under the Seaman’s
Manslaughter Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1115. The court deemed them outside of the 
statute’s admiralty purview because, as members of the vessel’s “drill crew” 
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400 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
that the blowout was “substantially related to a traditional maritime
activity.”
2. Deployment of the Deepwater Horizon as an “Offshore Facility,”
not as a “Vessel”
In a separate proceeding,275 the court ruled that the Deepwater Horizon 
“was being used as an offshore facility [not as a vessel] at the time of the
discharge . . . .”276 Its employment in the Macondo well event was
functionally interchangeable under OCSLA § 1333(a)(2)(A), that is, with 
that of a fixed platform or a lease block on which a well had been drilled.
The only SRTMA issue specifically addressed in B1 Bundle was whether 
the Deepwater Horizon is a “vessel.” OPA § 2701(18) confirms that 
outcome, of course. But the same section’s language that the Deepwater
Horizon is a vessel “capable of use as an offshore facility,” combined with
the district court’s affirmation that it was so used,277 goes directly to the
SRTMA concern for how the vessel was actually used, which is the heart
of the SRTMA issue. 
3. The Fatal “Discharge”: When Did “Loss of Control” Occur?
Under OPA § 2702(a), liability is placed on “each responsible party 
for a vessel or for a facility from which oil is discharged.” Clean Water
Act 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) also imposes its civil penalties on the
discharging party or parties, and it defines the term “discharge” using 
language essentially identical to that employed in OPA.278 Transocean 
claimed that BP and a co-venturer were at fault because the oil was 
rather than “navigation crew,” they were not responsible for “marine operations, 
maintenance, or navigation of the vessel.” Id. at 657.
275. In re Oil Spill, 844 F. Supp. 2d 746. OPA § 2702(18) defines a “mobile 
offshore drilling unit” (MODU)—the Deepwater Horizon’s classification—as a 
“vessel . . . capable of use as an offshore facility,” while OPA § 2702(9) defines
a “facility” as “any structure . . . or device (other than a vessel)” used for, inter
alia, “exploring for, drilling for, [or] producing . . . oil.” OPA § 2701(22) defines
“offshore facility” as “any facility of any kind . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters, other than a
vessel . . . .”
276. In re Oil Spill, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
277. Id.
278. The immediate concern in the opinion is liability to the federal
government under a CWA civil penalty provision, but, as the court notes in
pointing to the “similarity” of the paired provisions, id. at 757, both OPA and the
CWA define the term “discharge” as “includ[ing], but . . . not limited to, spilling,
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping . . . .” Compare 33 
U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (2018) (CWA) with 33 U.S.C. § 2701(7) (2018) (OPA).
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4012020] SRTMA: REAPPRAISING THE BP WELL BLOWOUT
discharged at “the place where the uncontrolled movement of oil
began,”279 namely, the sub-seabed well bore. BP and its former joint
venturer Anadarko blamed Transocean because the oil entered the Gulf
after it “passed through the [blowout preventer] and broken riser,” both of
which are “appurtenances of the [vessel].”280 The federal government 
blamed both, claiming that both discharged the oil.281 The district court
agreed with Transocean that the “discharge” occurs when and where “the
uncontrolled movement of oil began.”282 The Fifth Circuit ultimately 
rebuffed the district court’s so-called “single instrumentality” reasoning,
leaving the question unresolved while nonetheless affirming the district
court’s outcome.283 
The trial court’s reasoning fixed the location of B1 Bundle’s fault-
creating event in the Macondo well bore thousands of feet below the OCS.
The welter of the foregoing positions concerning the location and 
consummation of fault for the blowout’s discharge confirms the wisdom
of Executive Jet’s redirection to a focus on the nature of event, rather than
staying with admiralty’s traditional location standard when establishing 
the latter is so problematic. This is a sphere in which Executive Jet/BP
blowout and Kirby/Doiron are very much in sympathy with one another in 
discarding traditional rigid standards in favor of a searching examination
of the actual nature of the event before them.
4. “Drilling Crew” versus “Navigation Crew”: A Distinction with a 
Profound Difference
Finally, the 100-plus page opinion sharply distinguishes between what
it describes as the role of the Deepwater Horizon’s “drilling crew,” as
supplemented by BP drilling overseers, and that of its “navigation crew,”
whose function, with a single exception during the three-month drilling 
period, was to employ the “dynamically-positioned” MODU’s eight 
thrusters to keep the MODU relatively stationary over the well. Less than
one page of a 61-page statement of facts refers to the navigation crew’s 
actions throughout this three-month period,284 and less than five of a 26-
page set assesses an exception concerning the timing of the role that the
crew played in activating the vessel’s Emergency Disconnect System
279. In re Oil Spill, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
280. Id. at 757, 748.
281. Id. at 757.
282. Id.
283. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 772 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g 
en banc denied, 775 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom, Anadarko 
Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2891 (2015).
284. The half-page in question states that:
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402 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
(EDS) to allow the Deepwater Horizon to float away from the well. 285 The 
set concludes that “[d]espite the master’s initial failings, the Court finds
the HORIZON’s crew acted appropriately and bravely in the face of
chaotic circumstances that are, frankly, difficult to genuinely 
understand,”286 and the Court acknowledges that “activating EDS
[promptly] would not have avoided the explosions.”287 
Everything else in the opinion—all of the pages devoted to the 
introduction, operational details, and the complexities of parsing out
liability among BP, Transocean, Cameron, and Halliburton—addresses
what Doiron labels the inherently non-maritime dimension of a marine oil
and gas servicing operation.
The HORIZON had a master, chief mate, dynamic positioning operators, 
bosuns, able-bodied seamen, and ordinary seamen. These Transocean 
employees were commonly referred to as the “marine crew” and were
responsible for, among other things, the MODU’s navigation function
and keeping the MODU “on station” with the dynamic positioning
system. There were other Transocean “crews” aboard the HORIZON.
Notably, the “drill crew” was primarily responsible for the MODU’s 
drilling function and consisted of the Offshore Installation Manager, tool
pushers, drillers, roustabouts, and others.
In reOil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 671 (E.D. 
La. 2014) (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 725–28.
286. Id. at 728.
287. Id.
